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THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AUTOPSY IN JUDICIAL
OPINIONS UNDER SECTION 2035
By Thomas L. Shaffer,*'
with comments by
Robert S. Redmount, Ph.D.,**
and
Herman Feifel, Ph.D.***
The court's inquiry. . . is into the mind of the decedent, into that
'heap or collection of different perceptions.' Transfers prompted by the
thought of death, even if they are also prompted by other motives,
are includable in the gross estate. . . . The tax law does not require
us here to determine 'motive' in those words, but it seeks an equally
elusive shadow from the recesses of the mind of the deceased: did the
thought of death prompt him to act? . . . [T]he conclusion may not be
wholly intellectual. Decision may result also from intuition, emo-
tional reaction, and visceral response to the composite picture that
results from the images imposed on each other in court by advo-
cates with opposite motives, one bent on proving that the deceased,
whatever his age or health, was convinced of his immortality and
impervious to thoughts of death, and the other seeking to show
that the donor was weak of body and sick of mind, preoccupied
by the converging approach of the grim reaper and the estate tax col-
lector.2
It is surprising how many cases have been litigated under Section
20351 of the Internal Revenue Code, which imposes an estate tax on inter
* Associate Dean of The Law School, University of Notre Dame.
** Clinical Psychologist, Hamden, Connecticut; member of the New York Bar.
*** Chief Psychologist, Veterans Administration Outpatient Clinic, Los Angeles.
1 I have been generously encouraged and assisted in this and in other aspects of the
study of the psychology of testation by Dr. Shneidman and by two other distinguished
clinical psychologists-Dr. Robert S. Redmount, who is also a lawyer, and Dr. Herman
Feifel, who should probably be considered the founder of modem death psychology.
Dr. Feifel is responsible for the noted work, THE MEANING OF DEATH (H. Feifel ed.
1959).
2 Fatter v. Usry, 269 F. Supp. 582, 584-86, 20 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5941-42 (E.D.
La. 1967).
3 INT. Rv. CODE of 1954, § 2035(b):
If the decedent within a period of 3 years ending with the date of his death
... transferred an interest in property, relinquished a power, or exercised or
released a general power of appointment, such transfer, relinquishment, exer-
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vivos gifts in contemplation of death. It is also surprising that those
hundreds of judicial opinions embody rigid perceptions of human life,
and of attitudes toward death-perceptions which range from incisive
to naive. They disclose a judicial system of death psychology which
is detailed, systematic and (sometimes) accurate. This is an inquiry
into those opinions as psychological autopsies. The inquiry has sev-
eral practical possibilities:
-It may indicate something about the legislative wisdom in retaining a
tax provision which turns on a post-mortem assessment of the attitude
a dead man had toward his death.4
-It may indicate something about the judicial wisdom in construing a
statutory word ("contemplation") literally--as compared, say, with
the judicial wisdom in construing a similar word ("intended") to
refer only to the mechanical operation of a property-transfer device.0
-It may indicate something about trial tactics within a legislative and
judicial system which continues to impose death taxes on transfers
which are made in contemplation of death. It is an open secret that
the process as it now exists is chaotic, but it probably presents the
only common factual issue in federal estate tax litigation on which tax-
payers can usually expect victory.
-It may indicate something about the way men are as they approach
death. That assumes, of course, that judges are able to detect human
facts and to report them accurately. One would hope that the Section
2035 opinions reveal how judges think men are as they approach
death.
I make the inquiry against a model suggested by the eminent "sui-
cidologist," Dr. Edwin Schneidman, who proposed several years ago
a "psychological post-mortem."'7  He designed his system primarily
cise, or release shall, unless shown to the contrary, be deemed to have been
made in contemplation of death ... ; but no such transfer, relinquishment,
exercise, or release made before such 3-year period shall be treated as having
been made in contemplation of death.
4 See generally C. LowNDEs & R. KRAMER, FEDERAL EsTATE AND Gnrr TAxcs
60-79 (2d. ed. 1962); Lowndes & Stephens, Identification of Property Subject to the
Federal Estate Tax, 65 MIcH. L. REv. 105, 120-25 (1966); Riecker, A Pragmatic View
of Transfers "in Contemplation of Death," 53 M-N. L. Rlv. 265 (1968); Kimbrell,
Planning Insurance Transfers to Avoid Transfers in Contemplation of Death, 36 U.
Mo. KAN. Crry L. Rlnv. 1 (1968); Hochman & Lindsay, Taxation, Interest and the
Timing of Inter-Generation Wealth Transfers, 20 NAT'L T. J. 219 (1967).
5 United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102 (1931).
6 Shukert v. Allen, 273 U.S. 545 (1927). See C. LowDEs & R. KRAMER, supra note
4 at § 6.2; Wishard v. United States, 143 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1944); Estate of William F.
Hofford, 4 T.C. 790, affg 4 T.C. 542 (1945).
7 Dr. Shneidman has done an impressive study on the role of the individual in his
own death, His objective was a psychologically oriented classification of death phe-
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for death certification in suicide cases, but he developed it for all death
certification, and he demonstrated that it is a model upon which
attitudes toward death can be reconstructed after the man being studied
is dead. This is precisely what judges do in Section 2035 cases.'
The traditional judicial view of a gift in a contemplation of death
case implies that the dead man expressly, overtly, considered death as
the fact which would bring a series of plans into operation. Giving in
contemplation of death is seen as goal-striving behavior which death
will implement. I suspect that this view is unsound because it equates
"gift in contemplation of death" with "testamentary disposition". That
equation is at work in most of the cases. It is a judicial rule of thumb.
But it is probably psychologically inaccurate. There is a difference
between giving one's property away because one is going to die and
making written plans for what is to be done with one's property when
one is dead.
The format used here attempts to consolidate hundreds of Section
2035 cases into some kind of unified presentation by proposing three
prototype judicial opinions. Each of them is a composite of several
real cases; each contains within itself discussion of precedent cases;
nomena-an ordering based in large part on the role of the individual in his own death.
His analysis is based both upon the affirmative premise that a man's death is a personal
event, and the negative premise that our culture accepts "natural death" as an idol.
Both premises apply to section 2035 cases because United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102
(1931), makes the inquiry a personal one. Through his research, Dr. Shneidman dis-
covered that individuals fall into one of four categories in their manner of viewing their
own death.
In one paper, Shneidman applied his theory to Herman Melville. Dr. Shneid-
man believed that Melville's preoccupation with death, combined with his almost
obsessional resentment of literary critics, led him to a choice between protest and
withdrawal. Melville chose to withdraw and Dr. Shneidman equates this with a
"quasi" death. Therefore Melville was focusing on a post-self, a future in which
his real-self would be vindicated. I believe Dr. Shneidman's analysis is cogent
because the post-self concept has application in contemplation of death cases. A
man survives his death in those he loves and the things he owns. He lives on in the
act of giving away property. This is the type of living-on that Dr. Shneidman dis-
covered in Melville, and it is a part of what one contemplates when he contem-
plates death. See Shneidman, Orientations Toward Death: A Vital Aspect of the
Study of Lives, 2 INT'L JOtRNAL OF PSYCHIATRY 167 (1966); Shneidman, Orientations
Toward Cessation: A Reexamination of Current Modes of Death, 13 JoUrAL or
FoRENsic ScmNca 33 (1968); Shneidman, Suicide, Sleep and Death, 28 JOURNAL
OF CONSULTING PSYCHOLOGY 95 (1964); The Deaths of Herman Melville, in MELvILLE
AND HAwTHORNE IN THE BnxsrHum 118 (H. Vincent ed. 1966).
8 United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102, 119 (1931). 'There is no escape from the
necessity of carefully scrutinizing the circumstances of each case to detect the domi-
nant motive of the donor in the light of his mental condition, and thus to give effect
to the manifest purpose of the statute."
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and each demonstrates what I believe to be typical judicial perceptions
of human facts on attitudes toward death. A series of comments fol-
lows each of the prototype opinions; the comments are meant to sug-
gest what may become the law review case comment of the future-a
new approach which will combine close, logical analysis of what courts
have done with a behavioral consideration of the process involved in
the decision, and of the consequences the decision may be expected to
portend for the profession and the people upon whom the law operates.9
ESTATE OF WILLIAM VARNER' 0
(Tax Court)
William Varner died at the age of eighty. At issue are three transfers
he made during his life. The first, made two years, ten months, before
his death, was of a summer cottage in Michigan. This transfer was
made to his son, William Varner, Jr., "for the use of the grantor's grand-
daughter, Linda Snopes Cole." Linda Snopes Cole was the decedent's
granddaughter. The decedent's daughter and her husband died in an
airplane accident ten years before the transfer of the summer cottage.
The second transfer was of shares of stock in the Frenchman's Bend
Realty Company, a corporation which owned and managed farm prop-
erty in areas near the decedent's home. This transfer, made eighteen
months before the decedent's death, was of all of the decedent's interest
in the corporation. It mas made to his son, William Varner, Jr.
The third transfer, made six months before the decedent's death, was
of several parcels of real estate-two farms, ten acres of undeveloped
land, and the decedent's home. This transfer was to William Varner,
Jr., in trust for Linda Snopes Cole. It was accompanied by a complex
trust instrument which contained detailed directions for managing the
trust corpus, attemped restraints on its alienation, elaborate restrictions
on the alienation of equitable interests (spendthrift provisions) and
directions for the distribution of corpus and income to Linda Snopes
Cole and to her children, if she had any.
William Varner, Jr., as executor of his father's estate, timely filed a
9 See Redmount, Humanistic Law Through Legal Education, 1 CONN. L. REV. 201
(1968).
10 This is a composite of the following cases: Fatter v. Usry, 269 F. Supp. 582,
20 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5941 (E.D. La. 1967); Kiskern v. United States, 232 F. Supp.
7 (S.D. Fla. 1964); American Trust Co. v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 185 (N.D. Cal.
1959); Estate of Samuel Want, 29 T.C. 1223 (1958); Estate of Ernest Hinds, 11 T.C.
314 (1948), af'd 180 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1950); Estate of William C. Atwater, 3 T.C.
1223 (1944). The footnotes which follow the text are, through the end of the Varner
opinion, the court's.
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federal estate tax return, reporting these three transfers as not taxable,
and a gross estate exclusive of these transfers of $15,000. Since the
gross estate as thus reported was well below the exemption allowed,
the executor reported no taxable estate and paid no estate tax. The
values at death of the property transferred during life are stipulated as:
-the summer cottage, $65,000;
-stock in Frenchman's Bend Realty Company, $150,000;
-real estate in trust, $210,000.
The evidence is that the property had approximately the same value
on the dates it was transferred inter vivos and that after the trans-
fers were completed the property held by the decedent did not exceed
$20,000 in value.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue objected to the estate's posi-
tion on the three inter vivos transfers and issued notices of deficiency.
He claimed estate taxes of $96,200, which assessments the estate pro-
tested. The case is here on the following issue: were the three inter
vivos transfers includible in the gross estate under Section 2035 (a) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,11 which provides:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property
to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any
time made a transfer . . . by trust or otherwise, in contemplation of
his death.
This court must decide whether the dominant motive of the decedent
in making each of these transfers was prompted by the thought of
death. The leading authority on the tests which are to be applied is
the decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Wells,12 which
postulated the question as whether "the decedent's purpose in mak-
ing the gift was to attain some object desirable to him during his
life, as distinguished from the distribution of his estate as at death."1
3
The court stated that the Congressional purpose in Section 2035 was
"to reach substitutes for testamentary dispositions and thus to prevent
the evasion of the estate tax."'" We have determined that the transfers
were not in contemplation of death.
11 Section 2035(b) creates a rebuttable presumption that transfers within three years
of death are in contemplation of death, and a conclusive presumption that transfers
more than three years before death are not in contemplation of death. In addition to
these specific presumptions, determinations of the Internal Revenue Service are pre-
sumptively correct. See Neal v. Commissioner, 53 F.2d 806 (8th Cir. 1931).
12 283 U.S. 102 (1931).
13 Id. at 114.
14 Id. at 117.
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The cottage. The decedent was seventy-seven years old when he
transferred the cottage. The testimony is that he made the transfer in
order to provide a restful, pleasant atmosphere for his granddaughter, so
that she could spend her summer vacations there. The reason he trans-
ferred to his son, Mrs. Cole's uncle, rather than to Mrs. Cole, was that
Mrs. Cole was somewhat unstable mentally. She had twice been hospi-
talized for "nervous breakdowns"; her husband had divorced her about a
year before this transfer; she lived in the decedent's home when she
was not on vacation; and the decedent cared for her during periods of
emotional tension in her life. The evidence is that Mrs. Cole found the
summer heat in Frenchman's Bend oppressive and that she enjoyed
staying at the Michigan cottage and had stayed there off and on during
summers since she was a child. The decedent spoke many times be-
fore the transfer of making the cottage available to Mrs. Cole so that
she would not need to ask his permission to stay there.
Five years before he died, and shortly after the death of his wife,
the decedent stopped going to the cottage. Aside from a two month
visit by Mrs. Cole, the cottage was in caretaker status for a year and
a half after the death of the decedent's wife. About three and one-half
years before his death Mr. Varner visited the cottage on what he later
referred to as an "inspection tour". When he arrived he found the
caretaker intoxicated and the cottage neglected. Witnesses testified that
this discovery disturbed Mr. Varner and that he decided to "get rid
of the cottage". There is in evidence a letter he wrote William Varner,
Jr., enclosing a copy of the executed, recorded deed; that letter said,
in part:
Your mother always preferred Michigan, but I have never liked it. Be-
sides that, the worry of it has become too much for me; you have just
got to go ahead and run it. I have had enough, and, besides, I need
to reduce my tax bite. It has served its purpose so far as I am con-
cerned. I have my home in Frenchman's Bend.
As a matter of fact, Mr. Varner still had, at that time, extensive owner-
ship of real estate other than his home, as well as 25% of the
common stock of a real estate holding company there. The letter said
nothing of Mrs. Cole's use of the cottage, but the oral testimony was
that William Varner, Jr., understood that the cottage, "was really for
Linda," that the deed made that clear to him and that he managed the
cottage for her and intends to continue doing so.
The decedent's health, prior to seventeen months before his death,
was excellent for a man of his age. The first evidence of his terminal
illness arose after the transfer of the cottage and of the corporate secur-
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ities. He visited his physician with the complaint that he was not able
to hold on to things. The physician diagnosed his ailment as amyos-
themic lateral schlerosis of the spinal cord, a chronic degenerative dis-
ease of the central nervous system which is usually terminal in from
two to six years. The physician did not inform Mr. Varner of this
condition; he told Mr. Varner that he had a nervous condition, that
he (the doctor) would prescribe medication for it, and that Mr. Varner
should return for "checking up" at intervals of one month. At the
time of this diagnosis, Mr. Varner was active, cheerful and optimistic.
The physician never told him about his fatal condition, but he did
tell William Varner, Jr., about seven months before Mr. Varner's
death and the testimony is that William Varner, Jr., told his father
about the condition shortly thereafter.
We think that Mr. Varner, who made this transfer before he had any
information on his illness-even partial, undisturbing information-
did not develop an altered attitude towards life, nor was he affected by
thoughts of death. The evidence is that he was cheerful, pleasant, ac-
tive, interested in many facets of life, sociable and fond of many forms
of entertainment, including circuses, card games, and, when he was in
Memphis, burlesque shows. Few men many years his junior could
match his zest for living, both physically and mentally. We find as a
fact that the transfer of the cottage was not in contemplation of death.
The corporate securities. This transfer was made eighteen months
before death and one month before the decedent visited his physician
for what turned out to be a diagnosis of fatal illness. The transfer was
of all the decedent's interest in a corporate venture he had founded in
1928 and of which he had been variously president, secretary and treas-
urer. He resigned from office in the corporation three years before his
death, and turned the day-to-day management of the business over to
his associate, Colonel V. K. Ratliff. He remained as a director and saw
that his son, William Varner, Jr. (who was then a nominal share-
holder), was employed as secretary and business manager for the cor-
poration. Eighteen months before his death, Mr. Varner resigned as a
director and transferred all of his shares (about one-third of those
outstanding) to William, Jr.
Although he had begun to suffer some muscular instability, his phy-
sician testified that there was nothing in his physical condition, at the
time of the transfer of corporate securities, "which would lead any
physician to anticipate his death at any time in the near future." Cross-
examined about the condition which was diagnosed a month later, the
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physician said he was not sure that a diagnosis would have disclosed
this condition at the time of the transfer, and that in any event the
prognosis at that time would have been survival for at least two years.
Mr. Varner's transfer of the securities was a part of his general re-
tirement from business. Counsel for the government contends that he
was "letting go, preparing to cash in his chips." That charming meta-
phor is not so apt as it may appear. Mr. Varner remained active in the
management of rural real estate for another year. He climbed atop
houses to inspect roofs, walked in fields which he owned to estimate
crop yields, and even attempted minor repairs on his buildings. He
began at about that time to make extensive plans for travel, and even
to carry out some of them. He told his son and Mrs. Cole that he would
make a sea trip around the world within a few months after retirement.
He took an airplane trip to the World's Fair in New York City shortly
after the transfer of securities, and he went on extensive automobile
trips around his home region-some of them by himself. These travels
were strenuous and included hiking in the hills of his native state. Mr.
Varner's only complaint about his trips was that he was unable to de-
duct their cost on his income tax return. He took his physician on two
of these trips into the hills and the physician testified that he tired
more readily in hiking than did Mr. Varner. William Varner, Jr.,
hired a servant to assist his father around the house, but his father
resisted the servant and resented his presence. He never complained
about his health nor talked of death.
This evidence is similar to that on the cottage transfer. In the first
situation Mr. Varner's manifest motive was to provide a pleasant summer
retreat for his disturbed, unhappy granddaughter. In the case of the
securities, the transfer was to provide a secure business future for his
son, to reduce income taxes, and to enjoy, while he lived, his son's
growth and success in a challenging business. Here, as in the transfer
of the cottage, the dominant motives were living motives. Neither
transfer was made in contemplation of death.
The real estate. Six months before he died, Mr. Varner transferred
all of his remaining real estate to William Varner, Jr., as trustee for
Mrs. Cole. The estate argues that this transfer, like the transfer of the
cottage, was motivated by a desire to provide for Mrs. Cole. The gov-
ernment points to an additional circumstance-a steady, continuing
deterioration in Mr. Varner's health. Beginning about eight months
before his death (two months before this transfer), Mr. Varner had
been forced to curtail his activities. He cancelled his worldwide trip.
[Vol. 3
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One month before this trust transfer, he was hardly able to walk and
had to use a wheelchair when he visited his physician. He ceased to
complain about his servant and, in fact, became friendly with him. At
the time of the trust transfer he could no longer use either hands or legs.
The physician continued to tell Mr. Varner that he had a nervous con-
dition from which, he implied, Mr. Varner would recover. One month
before the third transfer, however, the physician finally told William
Varner, Jr., about the gravity of his father's condition. William, Jr.,
testified that he relayed this information to his father within two or
three days. He said his father took the information calmly, and that his
father's disposition remained cheerful. Not even then was Mr. Varner
given to morbid thoughts. He did not refer to his condition again, not
even in the final moments of his life. When he executed the trust in-
strument at issue, he told William, Jr., that his reason for the transfer
was to provide for Mrs. Cole. The estate argues that this fact, taken
with Mr. Varner's continuing optimism about life, is evidence of a life
motive, and we agree with that assessment. The size of the transfer,
although significant, did not leave Mr. Varner without funds and is
therefore not determinative, particularly in view of the fact that William
Varner, Jr., as trustee, did not disturb his father's possession and use
of the family home.
Mr. Varner is not shown to have entertained thoughts of death, even
when he was dying.' He was neither reticent about his physical con-
dition nor dominated by it.1  This is especially apparent when one
considers the transfers for Mrs. Cole, who was herself in poor health.
The gifts for her benefit were to establish her financial independence
and to protect her from the eventualities of a life which had been
cruel to her. 17  A person who retains a healthy mental condition
normally does not make gifts in contemplation of death.18  Mr. Var-
net's were not thoughts of death,' 9 nor were they thoughts which
combined death and the desire to avoid estate taxes. "Standing alone,
the desire to avoid death taxes cannot be deemed conclusive of a mental
state such as is contemplated by the statutory phrase. '20  His was a
15 See Moylan v. United States, 18 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 6240 (N.D.N.Y. 1966).
16 Helvering v. Tetzlaff, 1 CCIH Tax Ct. Mem. 461 (1943), affd 141 F.2d 8 (8th
Cir. 1944); see Estate of Chris M. Neilson, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1086 (1967).
17 Estate of Chris M. Neilson, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1086 (1967) involved a trust
for a retarded child, which is similar to the trust for Mrs. Cole in this case.
18 See Peck v. United States, 16 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 6125, 6130 (M.D. Ga. 1965).
19 See Stiles v. United States, 2 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 6391 (S.D. Fla. 1958) (jury
charge).
20 Rhoads v. United States, 12 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 6195, 6196 (E.D. Pa. 1963)
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more cheerful, more lifeful frame of mind.21  He was interested in the
happiness of his children and in helping them financially.22 He was
determined to carry out "promises and plans that were unconnected
with the thought of impending death ... .
Conclusions of law. The principal question in a gift in contempla-
tion of death case is factual,24 and a consideration of precedent supports
and confirms our factual conclusions. The decedent's health, which
was progressively worse at each of these transfers, is of course an im-
portant consideration. 28  But this court has repeatedly held that health
is not determinative of purpose in making lifetime transfers. In Estate
of Fielder J. Coffin26 and Estate of Benjamin Buerman,27 we held that
the existence at transfer of serious, even fatal, conditions was not con-
trolling in the face of evidence of living motives. This attitude is mir-
rored in opinions and jury charges from the federal district courts28 which
emphasize that cheerful demeanor and a disdain for morbid preoccupa-
tion indicate that a decedent has living motives even as he quite lit-
erally wastes into death. The controlling test, as the court said in
Peck v. United States,20 is whether the decedent "was motivated, moved,
propelled, by the same considerations that cause one to make testa-
mentary dispositions of property, and whether the gift made was a sub-
stitute for such testamentary dispositions without awaiting death. .... 30
We find that Mr. Varner's transfers were for the care of his grand-
daughter and the business success of his son and therefore not substi-
tutes for testamentary dispositions.
An additional factor as to the first two transfers is that Mr. Varner
(jury charge). See Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Bowers, 68 F.2d 916 (2d Cir.
1934), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 649 (1935); Denniston v. Commissioner, 106 F.2d 925
(3d Cir. 1939); Estate of Dell H. Higgins, 9 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 426 (1950).
21 The decedent in Altendorf v. United States, 228 F. Supp. 969 (D.N.D. 1964)
(jury verdict for taxpayer), was a cheerful 85; in Estate of Oliver Johnson, 10 T.C. 680
(1948), he was over 90; and in Metzger v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 830 (N.D.
Ohio 1960), he was an optimistic alcoholic. See also Carlson v. United States, 7 Am.
Fed. Tax R.2d 1825 (D. Minn. 1960) (jury verdict for taxpayer).
22 Estate of Jessie E. Bond, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 115 (1966); Estate of T.M. Flynn,
3 CCH Tax CL Mem. 1287 (1944).
23 Metzger v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 830, 834 (N.D. Ohio 1960).
24 Kentucky Trust Co. v. Glenn, 217 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1954).
25 Estate of Oliver Johnson, 10 T.C. 680 (1948).
26 13 CCH Tax CL Mem. 1149, 1152 (1954).
27 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 599 (1965).
28 See e.g., Gordon v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 542 (W.D. Mo. 1958); Peck v.
United States, 16 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 6125 (M.D. Ga. 1965) (jury charge); Stiles v.
United States, 2 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 6391 (S.D. Fla. 1958) (jury charge).
29 Peck v. United States, 16 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 6125 (M.D. Ga. 1965).
30 Id. at 6130.
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did not know he was dying. Early decisions in the Eighth Circuit 1
turn in part on the fact that the decedents had no knowledge of their
fatal conditions. In Neal v. Commissioner,3 2 as here, doctors did not tell
the decedent about his condition but did tell his family. The trial judge,
in Delaware Trust Co. v. Handy,33 reached a similar decision where it
was shown that the decedent suffered from arteriosclerosis but did not
know about it. Other cases in the federal courts are in accord,3 4 as
are Estate of George C. Mills, 5 Estate of George S. MacDonald,3 6 and
Estate of Frank Bloise,3 7 in this court. The decedent in Mills was told
he was ill, but not how long he had to live. MacDonald turned on medi-
cal evidence that the decedent may have been suffering from the disease
for several years without any awareness of being ill.38  There, as here,
the disease was serious and the life expectancy was uncertain. 9 There,
as here, the decedent did not talk about the condition even after he
learned of it. Bloise held for the Commissioner, but is distinguishable
because the condition there-terminal cancer-was diagnosed shortly
before the transfers at issue (not, as here, after two of the three trans-
fers), and because it was much more likely to bring speedy death.40
Other decisions in this court buttress our reliance on the rule that
serious illness is only minimally relevant when it is not shown that the
decedent knew he was ill.41
We detect in Mr. Varner's later life three features which emphasize
31 Neal v. Commissioner, 53 F.2d 806 (8th Cir. 1931); Willcuts v. Stoltze, 73 F.2d
868 (8th Cir. 1934).
32 53 F.2d 806 (8th Cir. 1931).
83 53 F.2d 1042 (D. Del. 1931).
34 Commissioner v. Gidwitz's Estate, 196 F.2d 813, 816 (7th Cir. 1952), citing and
quoting Allen v. Trust Co., 326 U.S. 630 (1946); United States Trust Co. v. United
States, 23 F. Supp. 476 (CL Cl. 1938), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 633 (1939); First Nat'l
Bank of Birmingham v. United States, 25 F. Supp. 816 (N.D. Ala. 1939) (family had
knowledge, but decedent did not); Estate of Wolfe v. United States, 10 Am. Fed. Tax
R.2d 6292 (E.D. Tex. 1962) (jury charge); Seattle First Natl Bank v. United
States, 11 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1824, 1827 (W.D. Wash. 1963): "The decedent did not
at any time have any serious thought of death or the imminence thereof...
36 5 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 768 (1946).
36 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1038 (1951).
37 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 251 (1966).
38 See Estate of Herbert G. Larsh, 8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 799 (1949); Estate of D.W.
Van Dever, 11 CCH Tax. Ct. Mem. 1179 (1952).
39 See Estate of Charles H. Martin, 2 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1063 (1943); Estate of
George H. Burr, 4 CCH Tax. Ct. Mem. 1054 (1945).
40 See Estate of Fletcher E. Awrey, 5 T.C. 222 (1945).
41 Estate of Lela B. Vardell, 35 T.C. 50 (1960); Estate of Ambrose Fry, 9 T.C. 503
(1947); Estate of Genevieve Brady Macaulay, 3 T.C. 350 (1944); Estate of Charles
Delaney, 1 T.C. 781 (1943); Estate of Lilly A. Fleishmann, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 362
(1954). See Estate of Robert W. Hite, 49 T.C. 580 (1968).
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that his thoughts were not thoughts of death. The first of these is the
relinquishment of his business life in favor of a pleasant retirement,
devoted to the care of his troubled granddaughter. The second is what
we regard as a manifest desire to draw closer to the two loved ones
who remained. The third is his desire to spend his last years in vig-
orous activity and travel. These factors combine, in our view, in a
life style which seemed almost to turn away from thoughts of death.
It was this life style which dictated the transfers at issue.
This life style can coexist with illness, and even with concern about
health, as we held in Coffin, Estate of Gus Sachs42 and Estate of Oliver
Johnson.43 Transfers made in these circumstances tend to contemplate
pleasant retirement from the burdens of life rather than from life it-
self. This is obvious, as we held in Helvering v. Tetzlaff," when one
considers that careful and burdenless living prolongs life. 45 Mr. Var-
ner's acquisitive years were over, but that is not necessarily a circum-
stance in which he would begin to contemplate death. On the con-
trary, he seemed to contemplate closer relations with his loved ones-
a factor which tends to prove living motives for property transfer.40
This factor is often present when the transfer is one to restore family
harmony, 47 but it can equally be present where the family has been
decimated by tragedy.48 We think Mr. Varner was concerned more
with what was thought of him while he lived than with happy memories
after he was dead.49 It is interesting to reflect how different the case
might have been had he no loved ones to draw near him in his last
years.5
0
He was also determined to enjoy the life which was left to him.
There are scores of cases in which physical activity, vigor and es-
pecially, travel and plans for travel, are held to be indicative of living
42 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mer. 960, 961 (1955): "A man who is not in good health
may, nevertheless, make a transfer which is . . . for purposes connected with life."
43 10 T.C. 680 (1948).
44 1 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 461 (1943), aj'd 141 F.2d 8 (8th Cir. 1944).
45 Id. at 466: "[HJis interest in and care for his health indicates that he was
devoting his attention and thought to the extension of his life as long as possible."
46 See Peck v. United States, 16 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 6125 (M.D. Ga. 1965)
(jury charge).
47 E.g., Estate of Halvor J.T. Jacobson, 9 CCII Tax Ct. Mem. 1112 (1950).
48 See Estate of Chris M. Neilson, 26 CCH Tax CL Mem. 1986 (1967).
49 Estate of George S. MacDonald, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1038, 1055 (1951): "We
cannot overlook the fact that the decedent appears as interested in what his family
thought during his lifetime, but indifferent to their views after his death."
50 Compare Estate of William Maxwell, 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1207 (1944) with
Metzger v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 830 (N.D. Ohio 1960).
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motives. In Delaware Trust Co. v. Handy,51 the federal district court
was influenced by the fact that the decedent, at the time of transfer,
contemplated a two year trip around the world.52 In Heiner v. Don-
nan,G3 which was reversed on other grounds in the Supreme Court,5"
the Third Circuit took account of the fact that the decedent was
an inveterate traveller, that he had-as Mr. Varner had-taken ex-
tensive automobile trips, and that he regularly went to Europe and
travelled in the United States. In Commissioner v. Gidwitz's Estate,
55
the court noted that the decedent, despite a serious heart condition,
"did not believe at that time that he was in danger of imminent death
but. . . expected to live for a number of years." 56 Evidence of this,
inter alia, was the decedent's habitual travel in the United States and
abroad, his fishing and automobile trips, and the fact that he did his
own driving. In that case the executor listed the decedent's last illness
as continuing for fifteen years. The transfer involved was one that did
not in fact benefit beneficiaries until after the decedent's death. De-
spite these factors the court found that Gidwitz's cheerful attitude to-
ward life, his energetic interest in travel and activity, was determinative
evidence of living motives for the transfer involved. Finally, in Old
Colony Trust Co. v. United States,5 7 the federal district court, deciding a
case in which the decedent took his own life, held that an active business
life and domestic and foreign travel within the year before death indi-
cated living motives in a trust transfer for children. The case resembled
Mr. Varner's in several respects and differs notably only in the fact
that Mr. Varner held onto his life until the last. A number of decisions
for the taxpayer in the federal courts of appeal have relied on the
fact that the decedent's general pattern of travel and activity indicated
that he had no thought of death at the time of transfer, 58 and decisions
51 53 F.2d 1042 (D. Del. 1931).
52 See also Dunn v. United States, 22 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 6038 (S.D. Ill. 1968)
(jury charge); Estate of George C. Mills, 5 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 768 (1946); Rea v.
Heiner, 6 F.2d 389, 391 (W.D. Pa. 1925); "The week before she died, she drove to
Pittsburgh three times, was preparing to go to Canada for the summer, making arrange-
ments for building a boathouse and sea wall there, and for changing the barn and build-
ing a dairy on the farm at home." Beeler v. Motter, 33 F.2d 788 (D. Kan. 1928).
53 61 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1932).
54 285 U.S. 312 (1932).
55 196 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1952).
56 Id. at 815.
57 Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States, 15 F. Supp. 417 (D. Mass. 1936).
5B Bradley v. Smith, 114 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1940); Tait v. Safe Deposit & Trust
Co. 74 F.2d 851 (4th Cir. 1935); Brown v. Commissioner, 74 F.2d 281 (10th Cir.
193 t). This factor was held not determinative, though, in United States v. Tonkin,
,fn F.2d 531 (3d Cir. 1945); Buckminster's Estate v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 331
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from federal district courts5 and from this court ° are essentially sim-
ilar on this point. In many of these cases the decedent had been
actively traveling at the time of the transfer in question;"' in others he
was making plans for future travel.62
We are aware of the limitations of judicial process in cases such as this.
We are not so much determining what William Varner was like as
we are determining what the evidence shows he was like. "We can-
not be certain that our portrait . . .is a lifelike replica . . but we
are confident that it accurately reflects the portrait . . . drawn by the
evidence in this record."6 3 We find that none of the transfers at issue
were made in contemplation of death.
COMMENTARY ON ESTATE OF WILLIAM VARNER
A. By Dr. Redmount
In Estate of William Varner, the Tax Court very skillfully wove
evidence, interpretation and opinion, and precedents from other ju-
dicial reasoning, to produce a plausible and perhaps a reasonable de-
cision and outcome. However, as the court is careful to note in its
concluding statement, "We are not so much determining here what
William Varner was like as we are determining what the evidence shows
he was like. 'We cannot be certain that our portrait. . . is a lifelike
replica . . .but we are confident that it accurately reflects the por-
trait. . . drawn by the evidence in this record.'" It might be noted too,
(2d Cir. 1944); Northern Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1940);
Updike v. Commissioner, 88 F.2d 807 (8th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 708
(1937); Stubblefield v. United States, 6 F. Supp. 440 (Ct. Cl. 1934). See United States
v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102 (1931).
59 In re Kroger's Estate, 145 F.2d 901 (6th Cir. 1944); Flannery v. Wlluts, 25
F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1928); Poor v. White, 8 F. Supp. 995 (D. Mass. 1934); Welch v.
Hassett, 15 F. Supp. 692 (D. Mass. 1936), rev'd on other grounds, 90 F.2d 833 (Ist
Cir. 1937), affd 303 U.S. 303 (1938); Estate of Ridgely v. United States, 20 Am. Fed.
Tax R.2d 5946 (CL CI. 1967).
60 Estate of Lilly A. Fleischmann, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 362 (1954); Estate of
Jennie E. Hinde, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 55 (1952); Estate of Benjamin P. O'Neal,
6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 713 (1947), affd 170 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1948); Estate of Mary
E. Cook, 9 T.C. 563 (1947); Estate of George H. Burr, 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1054
(1945); Estate of Nathalie Koussevitsky, 5 T.C. 650 (1945).
61 Estate of Lela B. Vardell, 35 T.C. 50 (1960), reVd on other grounds, 307 F.2d 688
(5th Cir. 1962); Estate of Salim Ackel, 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 110 (1958); Estate of
Robert W. Weir, 17 T.C. 409 (1951); Estate of Genevieve Brady Macaulay, 3 T.C.
350 (1944).
62 Estate of Emeline L. Green, 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 286 (1945); Estate of Charles
A. Bickerstaff, 1 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 28 (1942).
63 Estate of Oliver Johnson, 10 T.C. 680, 691 (1948).
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that the interpretations and opinions relating to William Varner and his
attitudes about death are those of men of certain age whose views of
life and of death are also relevant if not directly articulated.
Not only are there general reservations or uncertainties about the
judgment reached in the Vamer case, but there are particular reserva-
tions about the way the court arrived at or "found" its result and about
the result itself. Judicial decisions, as with much decision making, are
the result of selection and rejection, of emphasis and avoidance, and of
neglect and oversight, as well as belief and acceptance. It is on
both sides of the antimony that one will find the true case, albeit that
expediency requires a decision in one direction. Let us consider the
judicial neglects in the Varner case.
The court failed to attach any significance to, and even failed
to discuss, the fact of Varner's age. One may reasonably inquire
(since judicial precedent on the issue is not cited) whether a man of
seventy-seven contemplates, or consciously or unconsciously avoids, the
contemplation of death and its consequences. Perhaps the men of the
court, no more than Mr. Varner, like not to think about death, but that
does not mean that persons of middle or advanced age do not think
about death. The problem may be an evidentiary one. The vagaries of
the adversary system being what they are, perhaps nobody thought or
chose to inquire about evidence as to how Mr. Varner felt about his age
and its implications and what he did about it. Even granted an effort to
garner evidence on the matter, thought and contemplation on such a
sensitive issue may as readily lead to suppression as to expression. Mr.
Varner might very well contemplate death, and choose not to think
further or in any way talk about it. In fact, his whole mode of life-an
active, physical life-may be evidence of a strong desire to try to con-
sciously avoid contemplating death.
On the matter of health, which is closely related to age, the Tax
Court appears to have placed too much emphasis on statements con-
cerning Mr. Varner's terminal illness, and how it was perceived, ex-
perienced and handled. Sense and reason should alert a contemplative
court to the possibility, indeed, the likelihood, that a mentally normal
man, nearly eighty, who is ill, severely incapacitated and deteriorating
fairly quickly, would have some thoughts of death. However, the evi-
dentiary fabric for the court's decision could not very well incorporate
the thrust of such a view. Since comments about Varner's attitudes
toward, and awareness of his, health reveal a merely heuristic collection
of statements conveniently selected and placed, it is conceivable that
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there was, by this system, no verifiable evidence made available of
contemplation of death, even though the fact of quickening life failure
was inescapable.
The Tax Court relies upon and uses the rationale of the Supreme
Court decision in United States v. Wells64 to frame its questions. The
requirement read from Wells is whether "the decedent's purpose in
making the gift was to attain some object desirable to him during his
life, as distinguished from the distribution of his estate as at death."05
One cannot question the Tax Court's judgment in following precedent
according to the traditions of our judicial process, but one can question
the kind of judicial reasoning manifest in the precedent or in the use of
the precedent. The highest court, by offering the kind of distinction
on which to base a decision, and without further qualification as to how
the matter is to be weighed, provides more pegs at which to throw
rings in hope that one may hit. The expediency of this procedure is
clear, but the effect of the precedent as used in this case suggests that
any evidence of a certain kind that serves a decision is good enough.
It matters not whether the evidence is substantial or important in the
larger scheme of things. One could be finished with the issue of con-
templation entirely by making the literal argument, with whatever
minimal proof might be needed, that the decedent's purpose in making
a gift is always personal happiness and satisfaction in some form, clearly
objects desirable to him during his life. The court in the Varner case
virtually follows this cue with repeated reference to some acts and
thoughts in Varner's life, both related and unrelated to the transfer of
his property.
Other precedents the Tax Court uses may also be challenged for their
verity. The jury charge in Peck v. United States,8 a case involving a
similar issue, was used as precedent in the Varner opinion. Varner
interpreted Peck to declare that a person who retains a healthy mental
condition normally does not make gifts in contemplation of death. One
may as readily, and perhaps more validly, offer the opposite proposition
that a person who retains a healthy mental condition, given sufficient
personal circumstances, normally does make gifts in contemplation of
death. Various cases are cited 67 to the effect that cheerful demeanor,
and a disdain for morbid preoccupation, indicate that a decedent has
living motives. It is not facetious to state that some living motives are to
64 283 U.S. 102 (1931).
66 Id. at 114.
66 16 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 6125 (M.D. Ga. 1965).
07 See cases cited note 28 supra.
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be found in nearly every, if not every, living person, if that is to be an
evidentiary criterion. Much is made by the Tax Court of a series of
precedents indicating that evidence of illness has no bearing if the party
did not know of his likely and impending death. It would be incredulous
that many dying persons, and especially elderly dying persons, would not
feel, sense, or otherwise be aware of, or consider subsequent death.
It may be fairer to the Tax Court and to the courts it follows to
say that they choose not to find evidence of this, or they may have
difficulty finding evidence addressed to the point. The courts may feel
that public policy is better served and decisions come out "right" when
this line of evidence and decision is not followed.
If the object in Varner, as in other litigation, is to make a "case",
one could also make a "case" against the decision, with the same evi-
dence, being interpreted to support conclusions opposite from those
reached by Varner. In a logical sense and within the limits of available
or acceptable trial evidence, admittedly, the case would not have been as
strong meaning, not so well documented for "apparent" facts. But, in
terms of truth as it relates to human behavior concerning death, as well
as in terms of public policy preference, the more realistic decision may
be opposed to the Varner result. The need may be for better ways to
arrive at a better decision.
B. By Dr. Feifel
There is a presumption in the Varner opinion that the psychological
influence of death is necessarily proportionate to the temporal nearness
of actual death. This is not so. For example, you can be in good
physical health and, yet, fear of death can significantly guide your be-
havior more than it guides one who is seriously ill. Fear of death, as a
dimension, is not something which is limited specifically to the aged, ter-
minally ill, or combat soldier. It can be a motivating life factor at any
age.
The observation that Mr. Varner was cheerful, pleasant and active
does not inevitably imply that he was not contemplating death. What
we may be dealing with is his reaction to or coping with the idea of
death. Death is a multifaceted symbol which can be "terrible to Cicero,
desirable to Cato, and indifferent to Socrates." I had occasion to ask
terminally ill patients, "How would you use your time under the threat
of death?" A good proportion of them responded that they would
"continue on as usual", "draw closer to loved ones", "travel", or "do,
and accomplish". Mr. Varner's physical activity, travel and zest for
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life could also reflect his preparation for oncoming death. The fact
that he never complained about his health or talked of death to others
cannot, psychologically, be construed as necessarily demonstrating lack
of interest or concern about death. Not only could he be consciously
or deliberately withholding his true feelings from others, but thoughts
and anxieties about death could well be a steering variable for him on
a below-the-level-of-awareness plane, hidden from his own cognizance.
Psychological defenses which we term "denial" and "repression" might
well be at work here. This is particularly relevant in an area such as
attitudes toward death where our culture generally fosters an orientation
of camouflage and expulsion. Differing levels of awareness and knowl-
edge have to be considered.
With regard to Mr. Varner's "retirement", one must weigh the possi-
bility that retirement can be a means of disengaging from life and pre-
paring for death. What is viewed as being indicative of "living mo-
tives" may in reality be the possessing of as much of life as is possible
before death, although that feeling may not be verbalized or consciously
present.
C. By Professor Shaffer
The Tax Court in Varner, and the comments of Drs. Redmount and
Feifel suggest that there is judicial reliance on six preconceived notions
relating to death and property. The notions from which the precedents
have sprung will now be discussed.
Contemplation is surrender. The court has some difficulty in
pointing out that the transfer of the cottage was a relatively insignificant
transfer in terms of Mr. Varner's total assets. The court also belabors
the fact that Mr. Varner had enough to support a gracious retirement
after transferring the corporate securities. Finally, the court finds that
since Mr. Varner could and did live in the house until he died, its transfer
was not death-motivated. In other words, a death-motivated transfer
is one that lacks present day operation. This last point could as well
be made in reverse. Since Mr. Varner wanted the house to be used for
his granddaughter, and at the same time to live in it until he died (a
clearly testamentary frame of mind), the transfer was within the stat-
ute. It is interesting to compare the judicial assumption, that dying
people "give up", with clinical information: 8
[I]ndividuals on the brink of death or individuals who knew they
were to die in the near future experienced the greatest insights, the
68 Zinker & Fink, The Possibility for Psychological Growth in a Dying Person,
74 JouRmAL OF GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY 185, 186, 197 (1966).
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greatest joys, and important re-evaluation of their past lives ... greater
religious strength, greater love. integration and closure of their past
lives and sometimes 'grew.'
[W]e have found. . that many patients often are . . . concerned
with being respected as human beings, with being loved, and with under-
standing the nature of their illness. We have come in contact with sev-
eral critically ill patients who showed signs of psychological growth.
These individuals seemed to accept the fact of their coming death and,
having freed themselves from the burden of fighting for physical sur-
vival, felt free to feel close to their fellow patients, to be creative, and to
experience greater religious strength ...
[D]espite the fact that some dying individuals get "stuck" on certain
basic needs and often deteriorate psychologically, other individuals begin
to think in a more fluid way and are stimulated to examine their past
lives, to examine their beliefs, and to examine afresh the nature of
things around them. For the first time, they are able to cope with
questions that continually have plagued them.
Death is a medical matter. Civilized Western man is the only
animal to whom this norm is applied. It is assumed that other animals,
for example, elephants and mice, know enough to prepare for death
without having to be told. 69  The medical-death norm had two appli-
cations in the Varner opinion, both justified by precedent. The first
application assumed that Mr. Varner, even though he was almost eighty
years old and declining physically, would not be biologically or psycho-
logically aware that his condition portended death. The second and
corollary application of the medical-death norm is the court's treatment
of the fact that a physician (at the time the securities were transferred)
did not know Mr. Varner was dying and, therefore, Mr. Varner cannot
have known. The insight supporting both applications is that dying is
not a matter of human experience or of instinct. It is a matter of
medical information. Behavioral research is to the contrary because
there is now clinical and systematic evidence that dying people often
foresee their deaths at a virtually conscious level. Even more of-
ten they sense death unconsciously and begin an almost instinctive prep-
aration for it.70
69 K. LORENZ, ON AGGRESSION 235-37 (Bantam ed. 1967), discusses and compares the
Freudian "death wish" theory with his ethological findings and relates both to Margo-
lin's study of Ute Indians. J. GOODY, DEATH, PROPERTY AND THE ANcESToRs 278-81
(1962), discusses property transfers propter mortem in primitive societies in Africa.
70 Hutschnecker, Personality Factors in Dying Patients, in H. FEIEL, supra note 1 at
237; B. GLASER & A. STRAuss, AwARENEss OF DYiNG (1965); K.R. EIssLER, TnE
PsYcmArusr AND =n DYiNG PATIENT (1955); Joseph, Transference and Countertrans-
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Travelers forget death. This norm relates to the first two. It is
applied whether or not the traveler is dying or knows that he is dying.
The Varner court is candid about its assumption, both in terms of neg-
ative evidence (Mr. Varner's surrender of the cottage was actuated by
compassion for his granddaughter-who arguably gained nothing by it),
and in terms of affirmative evidence (Mr. Varner continued to climb
atop houses, go hunting, and take trips even when he was dying). The
genesis and growth of this travel-and-activity norm is probably related
to the death-is-surrender norm (or to a general attitude that death is
something that happens to a man, rather than something he does).
However, there is a substantial amount of literature which questions this,
which is relevant because judges often adhere to literary insight even
though they usually spurn psychological insight.
Tolstoy's story, Three Deaths, in which a dying consumptive woman
believes she will survive if she can make her way out of Russia, is an
example. (And incidentally her family and doctor think she does not
know she is dying.) 71 O'Connor's recent memoir on the last days of
the Irish poet and editor, George Russell, relates the fact that Russell
suddenly left his home in Dublin, gave away his possessions and moved
to London. Yeats remarked that this was a matter of his "giving
up the world to go on a world cruise." But O'Connor thought not:72
Of all the men I have known, Russell was most a creature of habit,
and for him to give up everything-his house, his books, his pictures,
his friends-was already a sort of death.
And there is solid behavioral evidence to support the poetic insight.7
ference in the Case of a Dying Patient, 49 PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE PSYCHOANALYTIC
RnviMw 21 (Winter, 1962); Weisman & Hackett, Predilection to Death, 23 PSYCHOSO-
mAic MEDic m 232 (1961); DEATH AND IDENTTY 293 (R. Fulton ed. 1965). Some
federal judges demonstrate similar insight. See Gregg v. United States, 13 F. Supp. 147
(Ct. Cl. 1936); Kengel v. United States, 57 F.2d 929 (Ct. Cl. 1932). The facts in Es-
tate of George H. Kent, 6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 933 (1947), are the kind of facts these
psychological researchers talk about.
Ridden v. Thrall, 125 N.Y. 572, 26 N.E. 627 (1891), is an interesting, largely im-
plied judicial recognition of the fact that men somehow foresee in their tissues not only
the time of death but maybe even the occasion of death. The decedent there had
given property causa mortis as he was about to undergo a relatively minor operation.
He died from a heart ailment, shortly after surgery. The question was whether he
contemplated the cause of death and the court held that he did-even though his
physician did not. See also CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1150-53 (West 1957) (codifying property
rules on gifts "in view of death.").
71 L. TOLSTOY, THE DEATH OF IVAN ILyIrCH AND OTHER STORMS 72 (1923).
72 O'Connor, Bring in the Whiskey Now, Mary, THE NEw YORKER, August 12, 1967,
at 36.
73 Shneidman, supra note 7; Feifel, Attitudes of Mentally III Patients Toward Death,
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Even practicing lawyers know that travel and death are psychologically
related. Those I have interviewed said that the prospect of a trip is the
usual reason clients come in to have wills prepared.
Dying people are sad. This norm has a tacit assumption-that
people who are dying may make gifts in contemplation of death-
but the court did not state it because it would have tended to under-
mine the court's conclusions on the house transfer. In explaining the
cottage transfer the court was almost intemperately anxious to mention
Mr. Varner's contemporaneous optimism, even though the evidence also
indicated sadness at the relatively recent death of his wife and disgust at
the intoxication of caretakers. In explaining the house transfer, the most
difficult part of the opinion, the court relied almost exclusively on Mr.
Varner's optimism in the face of a death which was obvious by this time
even to Mr. Varner himself. Mr. Varner's disapproval of the servant
his son provided for him was taken by the court to indicate that the
servant symbolized death. Life-centered man's reaction to symbols of
death is resentment. The court did not express that assumption,
possibly because Mr. Varner later grew closer to the servant, and even
then, according to the court, did not contemplate death.74
Support is only for life. Following what is perhaps the most com-
monplace of all platitudes in these cases, the court gave it as the
law that a person who is concerned about the support of loved ones is
not concerned about his death.75 The norm has two sub-norms. One
is that no one worries about how his loved ones will be taken care
of after he is dead (the life insurance industry to the contrary notwith-
standing). The other is that satisfactions derived from providing sup-
port are seen in terms of one's lifetime. This is a judicial denial of the
insight represented by Shneidman's "post-self" concept.7
6
122 JoURNAL OF NERvous AND MENTAL DISEASE 375 (1955), discussed in DEATH AND
IDENTITY, supra note 70, at 131, 137-39; Jung, The Soul and Death, in THE MEANING OF
DEATH, supra note 1, at 3, 10; Stem, Williams & Prados, Grief Reactions in Later Life,
108 AMERICAN JoURNAL OF PSYcHIATRY 289 (1951), discussed in DEATH AND IDENTI
240, 242. C.R. ROGERS, CLIENT-CENTRED THERAPY 115-23 (1965), reports a course
of psychotherapy which took a sudden, sharp turn for the worse when the patient
("client") was about to leave for a vacation trip. The reported interview and diary
material surrounding this event is filled with allusions to death.
74 Tolstoy's story, The Death of Ivan Ilyitch, supra note 71, portrays a dying man
becoming more human, more alive, as his death approaches. See the psychological
sources note 70 supra, and R.C. Fox, EXPERIMENT PERILous (1959).
75 The collection of suicide notes in E.S. SHNEIDMAN & N.L. FARBEROW, CLUES TO
Suscion 197-215 (1957), is heart-rending evidence to the contrary.
76 See Shneidman, supra note 7; B. GLASER & A. STRAuss, supra note 70, at 128, and
Feifel, Death, in N.L. FA.uERow & G.W. ALLPORT, TABOO Topics 8, 11 (1963).
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Dying people withdraw. This norm seems superficially to resemble
Slneidman's analysis of Melville's "social death", but the resemblance
is only superficial. The factual basis for it in this case is the conclu-
sion that Mr. Varner's retirement-retirement, ultimately, even from the
ownership of the roof over his head-was carried out so that he could
devote more time and attention to those he loved and so that he
could, by giving them property, entice them into unfamiliar intimacy
with him. The court takes this aspiration for togetherness to be the
opposite of withdrawal. Melville, by contrast, withdrew towards his
work (and would, Shneidman says, have withdrawn toward his family
too, if he could have). Melville and Mr. Varner did similar things, but
Shneidman's conclusion from this fact is that Melville was dying. The
court's conclusion is that Mr. Varner was not dying, at least not in
the tax sense.
ESTATE OF MARCH V. COMMSSIONER 77
(United States District Court)
This is a claim for refund of estate taxes paid, brought by the exec-
utor of the will of Ruth March. The taxes were assessed on the theory
that a single set of inter vivos transfers, made by the decedent on April
1, 1960, were made in contemplation of death and were therefore sub-
ject to estate taxes under Section 2035 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954. The case is before this court on submission to the court after trial
without jury. Briefs have been filed by the executor and by the govern-
ment.
The late Mrs. March was the widow of Leonard March. He died in
June, 1959; she died in August, 1962. While both were alive, very
little of the family's considerable wealth (in excess of $500,000) was
owned by Mrs. March. Leonard March's will provided that all of his
property was to be placed in trust; the income from the trust property
was to be paid to Mrs. March during her life, and she was to have a
testamentary power to appoint one-half of the principal at her death.
The other half of the principal-or all of the principal if Mrs. March
77 This is a composite of the following cases: Hoover v. United States, 180 F.
Supp. 601 (Ct. Cl. 1960); Abbett v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1293 (1952); Estate of Lillie
B. Carr, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 406 (1952); Estate of William L. Belknap, 10 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 769 (1951); Estate of Arthur W. Davis, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 814 (1952);
and Estate of Meyer Goldberg, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 977 (1951). The characters
and, to some extent, their personalities, are taken in part from C.P. SNOW, THE CON-
SCIENCE OF THE RICH (1960). The footnotes which follow, through the end of the
opinion, are the court's.
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did not exercise her power-was to be paid to Leonard March's brother,
Philip March. Mrs. March elected against this will, under applicable
provisions of state law, and was awarded one-half the estate of her hus-
band; the other half accelerated and was distributed to Philip March.
After this transaction Mrs. March owned approximately $250,000.
This was distributed to her in April, 1960. Within less than a month
she conveyed almost all of it-$232,000 according to the stipulation-
to her two children, Charles March and Katharine March Clark. At
her death, she had only $.8,000 and was living in a house which she
had deeded to her son as part of the transfers here at issue. The
question is whether the April, 1960, transfers were made with testa-
mentary motives. The inquiry is not whether the transfers were
made in contemplation of death, but whether they were not made in
contemplation of death.78 The estate has the burden of proof on this
issue.
Both Charles March and Katharine March Clark lived in their father's
house until they were in their thirties. Both married somewhat later
than is common in our society and both were married to persons of
whom their father disapproved. In Mrs. Clark's case, the marriage was
disapproved because her husband was not of the family religion. In
Charles March's case, the marriage was disapproved because Charles'
wife, Ann, had been at some point in her youth a member of the Com-
munist Party. Charles also incurred the disapproval of his father, sev-
eral years before his marriage, when he abandoned the profession for
which he was trained, the law, and decided to enter medical school.
Charles is now a practicing physician. Although the late Mr. March
paid for the education of these children (even including Charles March's
medical education) and provided for them generously, he vowed to
disinherit them if these marriages were performed. That, obviously, he
did.
The personality with which this court must primarily be concerned
is that of the decedent, Ruth March. But it is difficult to examine this
lady's purposes without examining also the character of her late hus-
band. He was a demanding father who lived in almost constant ten-
sion with his son. It is possible to conclude from testimony of Charles
and Philip March that Leonard March's disagreement with his son's
78 The statute seems to compel this negative formulation. See the forms of verdict
used in Jefferies v. United States, 19 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1847 (D. Tex. 1966), and
the court's explanation of the issue in Smith v. United States, 4 Am. Fed. Tax. R.2d
6108 (D. Utah 1959). See also Estate of Don Murillo Brockway, 18 T.C. 488 (1952);
MacDonald v. United States, 12 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 6191 (E.D. Tenn. 1956).
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choice of profession, and his disapproval of his son's marriage, were not
the real emotional reasons for his disinheriting Charles, but that their
differences ran deeper. On the other hand, the disinheritance of Mrs.
Clark was more "normar'-and even to be expected-considering the
elder March's devotion to his religion. In any event, it appears that Mrs.
March felt that the disinheritance of Mrs. Clark was justified, but that
the disinheritance of Charles was not. She determined, almost as soon
as Leonard March was dead, to right the wrong she felt had been done
Charles. She was heard to say that she intended to carry out her late
husband's "moral obligations", and that she prayed that she would
live long enough to do it.
Mrs. March had a cheerful disposition and did not complain of ill-
ness, although she was not particularly well, and was, at the time of
these transfers, seventy-eight years of age. She was never morbid and
did not discuss the prospect of death or future life with members of her
family, or others. In her early married life she was a jovial person-
talkative, fond of expensive clothing and jewelry. However, her first
child, a son, died in early infancy. The testimony of her brother-in-law,
Philip March, was that she was severely affected by this unexpected
tragedy and she thereafter showed less interest in social life and, when
her other children were born, concentrated her life on them.
She became frugal and did not, for instance, own a car. She does
not appear to have worried about her health. Although she appeared
not to mourn her husband's death excessively, she collapsed physically
about three months after the funeral. She was hospitalized and found
to suffer from "general depression, arteriosclerosis and fatigue." The
physician who attended her testified that the principal causes of her
illness were "old age and grief." She was released and treated as an
outpatient after one week in the hospital, and did not become seriously
ill again until about two weeks before her death. She was again hos-
pitalized, declined rapidly and died. The cause of death is listed on
the death certificate as "hypostatic pneumonia, cerebral hemorrhage
and arteriosclerosis."
She was generally calm and pleasant during the years following her
husband's death. Her condition, prior to the last illness, was not so
grave that the court can infer that it caused the idea of death to possess
her mind, nor was it good enough to constitute that sound health from
which could be inferred purposes entirely associated with life.
In January, 1960, when the distribution from her husband's estate
was imminent, Mrs. March invited her children to her home and an-
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nounced that she intended to "do right by Charles." Both Charles and
Mrs. Clark objected to her plans because they did not include equal
treatment for Mrs. Clark. Mrs. Marsh resisted them, stating that Mrs.
Clark knew why she had been disinherited and that nothing could be
done about it. They were in complete disagreement on the matter, with
one relatively minor exception: both children agreed with Mrs. March's
plans to deed the family home at Bryanston Square to Charles so that
he and his wife would "have the security of the family home in the event
of the ever present possibility of one kind of an emergency or another."
The three members of this family then entered into a two-month
period of bickering, an unusual circumstance for Charles, who had not
resisted his mother in the past. He apparently pursued the issue with
the zeal of one who has found a cause in which he can be unselfish,
and in which he can challenge the older generation.
In April, 1960, without notice to either of her children, Mrs. March
called her lawyer to her home and announced that she wanted trans-
fers made of all of her share of her husband's estate to the children
equally. Only at her lawyer's insistence did she even retain the $8,000
in cash with which she died two years later. Her lawyer reported that
she said that both children had insisted that they were entitled to their
father's money and that, although she did not agree with them, she was
weary of argument and wanted the lawyer to arrange the transfers.
As the lawyer left that day she said, "I am glad to stop all this talk. It
will be a relief to get it off my mind. They can have it." The instru-
ments of transfer were prepared within two or three days and conveyed
to the children, with a terse cover letter, prepared by the lawyer but
signed by Mrs. March, stating that the transfers were "out of love and
affection and in order to assure your independence and support." Mrs.
March's lawyer filed a gift-tax return for her for the calendar year 1960
which listed the motive for the gifts as "betterment of beneficiary-
peace in family."
Both children replied to Mrs. March's letters with gratitude and atten-
tion, which was, at first, spurned by Mrs. March. She told them that
the gifts were made so that she would not consider herself obligated
to them and that she wanted no more calls for money from them. How-
ever, Mrs. March's natural affection for her children soon overcame
this apparent resentment, and the family grew closer over the following
year. The children spent holidays with their mother; she rejoiced at
the birth of a son to Mrs. Clark; Charles provided for his mother's
support and made no claim to the house at Bryanston Square which
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she had deeded to him; and both children were at her hospital bedside
when she died.
The government contends that these transfers were testamentary in
character and that the critical motivation in making them lay with the
children---especially with Charles March-and not with the decedent
herself. The intentions of the two children, in the government's view,
overbore the will of Mrs. March, and their intentions were clearly testa-
mentary. The executor contends that both transfers fall within the pat-
tern of cases involving transfers to establish the independence and pro-
vide for the support of donees.79
The court cannot help but notice that the two theories are not neces-
sarily inconsistent. But of course the results to which each body of
precedent supposedly points are inconsistent. It may therefore be help-
ful to examine the factors that appear to have been prominent in Mrs.
March's mind, to decide which of them is dominant, and then to decide
what result is indicated by this dominant factor. (The government's
allusion to the intention of the children is relevant only insofar as the
court can infer that their intention became Mrs. March's.)
Pressure from children. An easy answer to this difficult determina-
tion would be to say that Mrs. March transferred virtually everything
she owned in order to stop the family argument. Transfers to avoid
the importunities of relatives have been held not in contemplation of
death. 0 However, I believe the executor is incorrect in his reliance on
the Estate of Dell H. Higgins,81 United States Trust Co. v. United States"2
and Estate of Halvor J. T. Jacobsen8 cases. The transfers in those cases
were, to be sure, responsive to family pressure, but none of them was like
the transfer here. In Higgins, the decedent transferred to protect her
property from her husband. The evidence was that she did this in
order to have it for herself, and in order to diminish pressure on her
which was literally destroying her health. She transferred in order,
79 Allen v. Trust Co., 326 U.S. 630 (1946); Llewellyn v. United States, 40 F.2d
555 (D. Tenn. 1929); Vaughan v. Riordan, 280 F. 742 (W.D.N.Y. 1921); Estate of
Charlotte A. Hopper, 22 T.C. 138 (1954); Estate of William C. Coffin, 9 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 1129 (1950); Estate of Robert M. McCulloch, 8 CCH Tax Ct. Mene. 110 (1949);
Estate of Bertha M. Engel, 6 CCH Tax CL Mem. 70 (1947); Estate of George H. Burr,
4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1054 (1945); Estate of Charles T. Smith, 1 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
518 (1943).
80 Estate of Emilie Weaver, 11 CCH Tax CL Mem. 1073 (1952) (decedent's
husband had died two years before the transfer at issue); Estate of William F. Hofford,
4 T.C. 542 (1945).
81 9 CCH Tax CL Mem. 426 (1950).
82 23 F. Supp. 476 (Ct. Cl. 1938), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 633 (1939).
83 9 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1112 (1950).
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physically and materially, to stay alive.
In United States Trust Co., the decedent transferred to her husband in
order to avoid the importunities of two of her twelve children. She
did so in order to prevent the dissipation of the estate at the hands of
the importuners. In Jacobsen, the decedent transferred property to
establish the independence of his wife after considerable pressure from
her. The decedent there wrote his wife a letter after the transfer ex-
plaining that he made it "so that from now on throughout our lives
this one cause of misunderstanding may be altogether absent ....
It is what I am anxious to do for you and for our life together."84 The
court did not feel that the disposition was testamentary. That situation
is somewhat similar to Mrs. March's, but it seems to me to differ in
one crucial particular. A husband who transfers property to his wife
still, in a very real sense, retains it. As a matter of fact, one of the
decedent's motives in Jacobsen was to remove the necessity for his
wife's asking him for money for personal and household needs. He
was providing by the transfer what he would probably have had to pro-
vide in any event. That is not true of transfers to adult children.
While it cannot be said that the family pressure consideration proves
that Mrs. March's gift was in contemplation of death, neither can it be
said that it proves the contrary.
Family unity. The executor points to the fact that Mrs. March's
transfers operated to pull her small family together after the death of
the head of the household-a living motive. The government contends
that the transfers were testamentary in effect because they operated, as
a will would have, to establish the financial independence of the chil-
dren. The government also points to the fact that Mrs. March's trans-
fers were within nine months of her husband's death, and within six
months of her collapse from grief and depression. Transfers soon after
the death of a loved one, which are temporally related to disabling
grief, are arguably death-related although this is not a factor that has
been significantly discussed in the cases.8 5
Fatter v. Usry 6 is a compelling instance of this phenomenon. Both
husband's and wife's estates were at issue. The husband, dying shortly
84 Id. at 1113.
St See Neal v. Commissioner, 53 F.2d 806 (8th Cir. 1931), where the decedents
rapidly declining health was undoubtedly related to the recent death of his wife.
United States Trust Co. v. United States, 23 F. Supp. 476 (Ct. Cl. 1938), cert.
denied, 307 U.S. 633 (1939), is a similar situation, but the court held for the Govern-
ment Estate of George M. Spiegle, 11 CCII Tax Ct. Mem. 1004 (1952), is also
factually similar but the court does not discuss this factor.
80 20 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5941 (E.D. La. 1967).
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after his wife, who cared for him like a child, had apparently wasted
away after her death. In that case, though, and in Estate of Mary
C. Budd, r the death of a loved one was an expressed, obvious,
health-related obsession in the decedent. In Budd, where the decedent
mourned her dead daughter, there was even evidence that she did
not want to live. This was an important part of what the court found
to be "a general attitude of mind inviting contemplation of death." s
In a way, her transfer of property was suicidal. Finally, Estate of
Fielder J. Coffin,8 9 makes a point which seems important here: the de-
cedent there had been depressed virtually all of his life because of the
death of his father. His change in personality was doubtless related to
the effect of parental death, but his was not shown to be a death-contem-
plating personality. The court held for the taxpayer. We find here, as
the court found there, that the deaths of Mrs. March's first child and
the more proximate death of her husband, did not cause her to con-
template her own death.
The fact that she made these transfers in order to benefit her children
economically seems clearly established. This sort of transfer is like the
transfer in Estate of Annie T. Stinchfield,90 where a wife conveyed to
children in discharge of her husband's moral obligation and to secure
isolation of assets from the risk of her husband's business. Similarly, in
Kaufman v. Reinecke,9' the transfer was to remove assets from the opera-
tion of a corporate buy-sell agreement. 92 There also are resemblances
to In re Kroger's Estate93 and other cases,9 in which a father transfers
property to insulate it from the demands of a second wife. In Kaufman,
the court spoke of a gift in contemplation of contract; and in Kroger v.
Commissioner, of a gift in contemplation of marriage. What did Mrs.
March's gift contemplate? It will not do to answer that it was intended
87 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 601 (1945).
88 Id.
89 13 CCHI Tax Ct. Mem. 1149 (1954).
90 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 511 (1945), rev'd on other grounds, 161 F.2d 555 (9th
Cir. 1947).
91 68 F.2d 642 (7th Cir. 1934).
92 See also Brown v. Commissioner, 74 F.2d 281 (10th Cir. 1934).
93 145 F.2d 901 (6th Cir. 1944).
94 Lippincott v. Commissioner, 72 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1934); Terhune v. Welch, 39 F.
Supp. 430 (D. Mass. 1941), rev'd on other grounds, 126 F.2d 695 (1st Cir. 1942) ("a
present arrangement of his affairs in view of his coming marriage"); Estate of Samuel
Want, 29 T.C. 1223 (1958) (in which transfers were to protect the decedent's daughter
from a lady-friend); Estate of Berman Barad, 13 CCHI Tax Ct. Mem. 223 (1954). See
Studebaker v. United States, 211 F. Supp. 263 (N.D. Ind. 1962); Estate of Charles J.
Rosebault, 12 T.C. 1 (1949); Estate of E. Coray Henry, 16 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 352
(1957).
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to establish the financial independence of her children, because that is
factually ambiguous and an observation which begs the question. It is
important to notice that this was not simply one of a lifelong series of
transfers to children, which would present a different case.
9 5
There are cases9 in which the gift was held not in contemplation of
death because the decedent desired to see the donee made financially
independent. In Wishard v. United States,97 the court thought that a
transfer to make a wife and sister independent of the financial vicissi-
tudes the decedent might encounter was with lifetime motives. But
that factor-risk-is not present here. Mrs. March's only risk was the
risk of death. In Des Portes v. United States,98 the court held purchase
of single-premium life insurance not in contemplation of death, but that
case relies heavily on the decedent's good health. As previously noted,
the state of Mrs. March's health is of no probative value one way or the
other. In Estate of Ernest Hinds,99 the issue of health was closer, but
the court, erroneously, in our view, held it determinative.
This case seems to more closely resemble Igleheart v. Commis-
sioner 00 and Neal v. Commissioner.' The Igleheart court distin-
guished between a transfer for the economic health of the donee during
the transferor's life and a transfer to secure economic health after the
decedent's death. The latter is in contemplation of death.
The Igleheart court also relied on the fact that the arrangement
was to provide for the donee in the event the donor was "absent," which
in the circumstances was held to mean "dead." The same conclusion
is possible here, with reference to the transfer of the house "in the
event of the ever present possibility of one kind of an emergency or
another." We place no particular weight on the letter Mrs. March sent
her children, which was drafted by her lawyer (circumstances are more
important than a lawyer's words, and the circumstances here, as in
Neal,10 2 are testamentary). 0
95 Belyea's Estate v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1953).
906 Wishard v. United States, 143 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1944); Des Portes v. United
States, 171 F. Supp. 598 (E.D.S.C. 1959); Estate of Ernest Hinds, 11 T.C. 314
(1948).
97 Id.
98 171 F. Supp. 598 (E.D.S.C. 1959).
99 11 T.C. 314 (1948).
100 77 F.2d 704 (5th Cir. 1935).
101 53 F.2d 806 (8th Cir. 1931).
102 Id. at 808. The court quoted a letter written by the decedent which accom-
panied the gift: "I hope you will keep this present intact as much as possible, and will
enjoy the income therefrom the rest of your life. I trust you will see fit to, in turn,
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The executor insists, however, that this was a transfer to "pull the
family together" after the death of a strong and vengeful father. Family
harmony, as a purpose of gift giving, is usually conceded to be not in
contemplation of death,104 although the contrary has been held where
there is strong evidence of death-centered motivation, as, for instance,
where poor health is shown. 10 5 An excellent treatment of the point is
to be found in Russell v. United States,1 6 in which the female decedent
had transferred property to her son in order to induce him (and his
wife and children) to remain in her apartment building.10 7  That situ-
ation is somewhat like Mrs. March's, and were it not for evidence of
testamentary motive, coupled with the statutory presumption against the
taxpayer, it might be determinative.
Reward-Revenge. The executor argues, finally, that these transfers
were made to reward Mrs. March's children and to redress the wrong
done Charles by the late Mr. March, and possibly to obtain some
measure of retaliation against a domineering husband and father. There
are several cases'08 in which the transfers involved were vindictive, but
they seem wide of the mark here. It may be that Mrs. March was
vindictive, but that is conjecture. There is no evidence of anything
but positive motives in both her desire to restore Charles' patrimony to
him and her ultimate decision to treat Katharine equally. The same
can be said of the argument that she was fulfilling a moral obligation of
her husband, 0 or rewarding the children for something.110
divide this gift between your children when you get ready to provide for their welfare
after you are gone."
103 See the factors outlined in the jury charge in Robinson v. United States, 8
Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 6082 (N.D.N.Y. 1961).
104 Wishard v. United States, 143 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1944); Estate of Corn D. Metz,
10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 970 (1951).
105 Igleheart v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 704 (5th Cir. 1935); Estate of Robert W.
Bite, 49 T.C. 580 (1968).
106 260 F. Supp. 493 (N.D. IMI. 1966).
107 Id. at 503: "The dominant motive prompting the transfer was that of insuring
that her grandchildren, whose presence was a source of happiness to her, would re-
main as tenants of the building in which she resided." See Estate of Baxter v. United
States, 22 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 6047 (E.D. Ark. 1968).
108 United States Trust Co. v. United States, 23 F. Supp. 476 (Ct. Cl. 1938), cert.
denied, 307 U.S. 633 (1938); McGregor v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 948 (1st Cir. 1936);
Estate of Berman Barad, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 223 (1954); Estate of Charles E. Haley,
10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 805 (1951).
109 Willcuts v. Stoltze, 73 F.2d 868 (8th Cir. 1934) (promise to late wife);
Studebaker v. United States, 211 F. Supp. 263 (N.D. Ind. 1962); Estate of Charles J.
Rosebault, 12 T.C. 1 (1949). See Duna v. United States, 22 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 6038
(S.D. IMI. 1968).
110 Belyea's Estate v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1953) (involving, how-
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In the view we take of the case-which is that, on balance, Mrs.
March's transfers appear to be the sort of transfers she could have made
by will, this consideration is ambiguous. A parent may reward and
punish his children and redress past wrongs as fully in a will as in inter
vivos transfers. When a factor in a gift in contemplation of death case is
ambiguous, the case must be decided on other factors. In my opinion,
the testamentary factors discussed above, point to the application of the
statute in this case.
The burden of deciding what was in the mind of a person long dead,
at a point in time months before her death, is almost too much for
Congress to have required of the judiciary:
It is unfortunate that the Congress, in the estate tax law, used the
phrase "in contemplation of death", without defining its intended mean-
ing; and it is equally unfortunate that courts should undertake the leg-
islative function of defining the legislative intent. . . . The fact that
every person of sound mind knows that he will eventually die makes
it indefinably difficult to determine when persons act in contemplation
of death and when they do not. The best that can be said of such a
decision is that the judge, having the duty of deciding, exercised his best
judgment. The decision on such a problem is inherently difficult."1
In the last analysis, it is sufficient to hold, and this court does hold, that
the executor has not met the burden of proving that Mrs. March's trans-
fers to her children were not in contemplation of death.
COMMENTARY ON ESTATE OF MARCH V. COMMISSIONER
A. By Dr. Redmount
In March, some of the matters with which issue is taken are in many
respects very much like the neglected matters of the Vamer case. The
effects of age and illness on the contemplation of death are recurring
considerations. In March, as in Varner, one might think that the issue
is over and the decision is gainsaid when the court, following prece-
dent, thus frames the matter: "The inquiry is not whether the transfers
were in contemplation of death, but whether they were not made in
contemplation of death." It is not hard to realize and not hard to prove,
using the thinking of the Varner case, that every or nearly every
person in some manifest way contemplates life as well as, or more than,
death. Perhaps the judicial result one comes by with such thinking is
ever, a series of lifetime gifts); Estate of Carrie M. Cowan, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 595
(1965); Estate of Baxter v. United States, 22 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 6047 (E.D. Ark. 1968).
1M1 Des Portes v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 598, 602 (E.D.S.C. 1959).
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no more than the execution of legislative intent, but if so, then why
bother to insert Section 2035 of the Code? The court in the March
case does better. It seeks the "dominant factors", thus seeking to bal-
ance the possibilities, rather than any available peg on which to hang
its decision.
In the effort to balance life and death motives the court seeks to
establish something about Ruth March's contemplation of death from
her relationships with her children. Almost inevitably, the court must
enter the realm of psychological speculation about family relationships.
The court seems to be aware of the intricacy and subtlety of family re-
lations. It does not oversimplify. It recognizes that to understand
Ruth March's attitude in transferring property to her children is also
relevant and important to understand her relationship with her deceased
husband and his attitudes. It also recognizes a distinction between real
or more meaningful and apparent attitudes. It speculates that the
father's "disagreement with his son's choice of profession, and even his
disapproval of his son's marriage, were not the real emotional reasons
for his disinheriting Charles, but that their differences run deeper."
The court gives further evidence of psychological sophistication in
the recognition that ostensible acts may be ambiguous as to their mean-
ing and purpose, and inconclusive on their face. Seeking conclusions,
or perceiving the impossibility of establishing them, the court recognized
that the status of Mrs. March's health could be valued in terms of both
a life interest and a death interest. It decided that Mrs. March could
have transferred wealth because of pressure from her children, that she
could have done so to create or preserve family unity, but it still recog-
nized that her decision in either instance might as readily have reflected
testamentary motives at the same time. Finally, the court reached a
procedural point to arrive at a solution, and "passed the buck". It de-
cided, under statutory authority, that the executor had not satisfied the
burden of proof that Mrs. March did not make a transfer "in contempla-
tion of death".
The court, in the concluding statements of an astute decision, identi-
fied the culprits who saddled it with a problem of psychological analysis
and decision making that it was not prepared to handle. "The bur-
den of deciding what was in the mind of a person long dead, at a point
in time months before her death, is almost too much for Congress
to have required of the judiciary." It quotes Des Portes v. United
States,'12 where the court states, "[T]he fact that every person of sound
112 Id.
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mind knows that he will eventually die makes it indefinably difficult to
determine when persons act in contemplation of death and when they
do not." Perhaps Des Portes makes the point with exaggeration, but the
matter of finding precedence in life or death motives is a difficult evi-
dentiary task. It assumes, with the possible exception of findings re-
lating to suicide, more systematic or certain knowledge about psycho-
logical experience relating death, and to death vis-a-vis life, than now
exists.
Section 2035 of the Internal Revenue Code puts in issue the matter
of the transfer of property in contemplation of death. The issue is one
of great behavioral and psychological complexity and even ambiguity.
The matter of contemplation. To contemplate, a mental act, is
"to have in view" or to give "attentive consideration". One must deter-
mine that contemplation has taken place, more from logic than from
observation. And, one must rely on evidence from behavior sufficient
to support a conclusion.
If we regard the matter as procedural, the decision-making may not
be difficult. The process of inference allows great latitude in specula-
tion, especially where all the acts and events to which the logical process
applies are not clear and certain. And, if one regards behavior ex-
tempore and not as part of a system, any and all behavior can be
used freely in speculation and interpretation. One can build a neatly
contrived cardboard pyramid of seemingly purposive behavior from
passing remarks, momentary stresses, exaggerated dispositions, circum-
stantial occurrences and the like. And the mortar of interpretation that
accounts for the pyramid derives, not from close validation of individual
experience within a careful scientific framework, but from logical im-
plications of selected events, general or reasonable meanings attached
to personal phenomena, juxtapositioning of events to reduce or to
emphasize absurdities, and the like. In short, if one searches for
"contemplation" as a matter of juridical procedure, one likely can make
a case for contemplation and, if one chooses to recognize it, one can
make a case against contemplation. The issue turns on whether the
judge objectively decides or bases his decision on purely impressionistic
phenomena that strike him most vividly and tend to tilt his thinking.
Contemplation from a substantive point of view may be another mat-
ter. And it may be more properly and reasonably the province of the
psychologist who truly seeks to examine behavior than of the jurist,
whose essential effort and responsibility is to somehow pass judgment.
Contemplation, from this view, is part of a system of behavior. Con-
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templation may be goaded by external events, or by internal stresses
and needs. It may be evidenced in verbal and expressive behavior, in
symbolic behavior, or it may not be observably evidenced at all. It
may be an intense, meaningful and continuous experience, or it may be
relatively brief, passing or unimportant. If the system of behavior in
which contemplation is regarded is to be complete, then the reasons and
circumstances for non-contemplation may be just as important as the
causes and phenomena relating to contemplation. A person who is
too anxious may suppress rather than contemplate, because the issue
that concerns him is too important and disturbing, rather than unim-
portant and unnoted. One may contemplate a particular event or cir-
cumstance because one is, relatively, a contemplative person. Or, one
may not contemplate important events or circumstances because one is
not, tempermentally or for other reasons, disposed to such a kind of
thinking.
The concern about death. Even given the study of "contempla-
tion" by a jurist in a life-probing sense, there are yet other difficult shoals
in the interpretation of mental acts and behavioral phenomena. The
contemplation in this instance is the contemplation of a phenomenon
called death. "Death" is a behavioral event, a matter of psychological
interpretation, a social phenomenon and a theological construct. It
has legal implication, social significance, and consequences of various
kinds. In personal terms death is "in the eye of the beholder". It is
either thought of, or perhaps deliberately not thought of, by the octo-
genarian. It is a matter of recklessness and some indifference to some
younger persons. It is a prospective event to be reasoned for the more
thoughtful person, but it is also one consciously to be avoided by the
more anxious individual. Death attaches to soul, psyche, relation and
property, but it likely does so in different ways for different people.
And, as if this were not difference or difficulty enough, there is even
an implied behavioral norm in our culture that shuns the open and
conscious contemplation of death. Thus, in itself and in its attending
features, it is an experience ripe for more intense and specific psycho-
logical and social investigation.
Usually it is fear and anxiety that attaches to death or to the thought
of death. Fear and anxiety may be expressed or revealed in different
ways. There may be preoccupation in particular thought and feeling,
so that there may be considerable evidence of concern about death.
There may be denial, and reactive behavior to deny any contemplation
of death when there is really great concern about it. There may be a
displacement to other concerns, such as a concern about one's prop-
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erty or an interest in religion, which may be a preoccupation in place
of or on top of stronger and possibly more terrifying concern about
death. There may be a substitution from an interest or concern about
death to an interest and exaggerated involvement in having fun or main-
taining health.
The importance of property. Finally, in the juridical questioning of
matters possibly relating to future interests, it is not only the mental act
of contemplation and the phenomenon of death that are to be compre-
hended in some terms. It is also the social and legal data, and in this
context, the psychological meaning of property, that should be identified.
Property as an extension of individual personality, defining and affecting
intimate as well as business relationships, is not clearly understood.
The value and the meaning of property may be akin to the incidents to
a drive in certain personalities. The "acquisitive or possessive drive"
may function not unlike sexual or aggressive drives. To some person-
alities, it may be one of the less important modes to personality ex-
pression and interpersonal relationship. The point is, property is an
important psychological phenomenon on which many human relation-
ships in our society turn. It is used in the exercise of power, of love, of
guilt and remorse, of hope and resignation, and in many other ways.
The character as well as the use of property can be in large part an
idiom of personality. There are psychological dispositions, social con-
ventions and legal conventions regarding the character, the value and the
use of property. Psychological dispositions in this matter are hardly
illumined. It is an act of sheer intellectual creativity when jurists probe
motives regarding the meanings and uses of property thought to be
exercised possibly in the contemplation of death.
Policy choices and means of decision. Whatever the status of our
system of inquiry and our knowledge about transfer of matters of per-
sonal right and value in contemplation of death, sooner or later some
policy choices must be faced. In the matter of estate taxation, it may
be a form of abandonment and irresponsibility to say there is insuffi6ient
knowledge or inadequate procedure on which to act equitably or in-
telligently. Legislative enactments and judicial process are best thought
of as approximations--"most reasonable" or "best available" means-
for dealing with some complex social problems. The issue is not
"should there be" enactments on estate taxation but "what kind", not
"should it be decided" but "who is to decide" and "how".
In the matter of statutory enactment, the issue regarding Section 2035
of the Internal Revenue Code may present itself on the question of
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
whether objective or subjective criteria should be utilized in deciding
about transfers before death, considering the current state of our knowl-
edge about motivations leading up to death. It is at least easier, if not
possibly more reasonable or more accurate, to accept only: 1) evidence
of age (any person over sixty?), 2) professional certification of health
(determined evidence relating to terminal illness), 3) transfer of prop-
erty executed shortly before death (within a year of death, unless this
presumptive evidence of death transfer is conclusively refuted "beyond
a shadow of a doubt"), and perhaps some other, similar tests to deter-
mine whether a testamentary transfer has occurred.
The issue in Section 2035 regarding judicial determination, especially
on the matter of "contemplation of death", may be thought to raise a
question as to whether a panel or commission of behavior experts may
be used best to advise the court on this consideration. The question,
if it is not semantically modified, largely voided of substance through
legal fiction and convention and the like, or abandoned to fairly unre-
strained logical exercise, presents a profound psychological problem.
The most expert judgment and advice is likely to lack full understanding
and agreement, but again, it represents a truly best effort on which a
judge could more comfortably and veritably rest his ratio decidendi.
The "panel of experts" idea really addresses itself to two issues re-
garding trial procedure in the matter of Section 2035 of the Code. Such
panels may be used as part of the end process in decision-making ma-
chinery, in this case as an adjunctive or advisory function in deciding
the outcome of a case. They may be used also to augment or replace
the adversary process in the matter of acquiring and presenting evi-
dence. The relative efficacy of the adversary process in dealing hon-
estly, reasonably, thoroughly and reliably with complex social and psy-
chological behavior is the subject of a brief that in itself would over-
shadow the issues presented by Section 2035 of the Internal Revenue
Code. It may be easier to grant, for'the moment, that experts as well as
laymen, and evidentiary procedures used in psychology and in other
forms of science as well as those used in law, should be systematically
used, presented and evaluated on all matters of social and psychological
behavior before the courts.
B. By Dr. Feifel
A finding of mine which I think has relevance for the March case
and makes things somewhat more thorny is the information that attitudes
toward death can oscillate in the same individual from strong avoidance
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to calm acceptance. The point in time one centers on can be crucial.
My data underline the coexistence of contradictory attitudes toward
death, i.e., realistic acceptance of death and its simultaneous rejection
in a subtle equilibristic balance in numerous persons.
[There follows portions of the text of a brief report, "Perception of
Death as Related to Nearness to Death," by Dr. Feifel and Mr. Robert
B. Jones of the Veterans Administration Outpatient Clinic in Los An-
geles." 3  It is reproduced here with permission of the authors and of
the American Psychological Association." 4 The research reported was
conducted on 371 persons in four major groups-seriously and term-
inally ill (ninety-two); chronically ill and physically disabled (ninety-
four); mentally ill (ninety); and healthy (ninety-five). Their ages
ranged from twelve to eighty-nine, with a mean age of forty. All groups
were average in intelligence, high school graduates and of average socio-
economic status. About half were male and a few more than half were
Protestant. The data were secured by psychologists and psychiatrists
using tests, rating scales, and open-ended questionnaires. Qualitative
answers were scored by investigators who showed a percentage of agree-
ment ranging from 81% to 96%. These findings-especially as to
denial defenses-are as important for Varner as for March.]
"Man is a creature in time and space whose consciousness permits
him to nullify their strictures. Anticipation steers many of his delibera-
tions, and expectation serves as a principal mediator of goal-directed
and purposeful behavior. One cogent aspect of this capacity, it seems,
would be the influence on the individual of temporal nearness or dis-
tance from probable personal death. One's perception of the world and
attitudes toward death might not be quite the same next week as it is at
present if one were then to learn of a. . . cancer ...
"With regard to consciously verbalized fear of death, a majority
(71%) of all the groups denied fearing death primarily because 'it's
inevitable.' Those who admitted to fear of death did so essentially be-
cause of 'fear of the unknown.' Frequency of thoughts about dying
and death was dominated by 'rarely' (44%) and 'occasionally' (42%).
Almost half (49%) stated that no changes had occurred in their atti-
tudes toward death since their illness (patients) or in the past five years
(healthy), with another 30% actually indicating less fear now than
heretofore. Additionally, a majority. . . in each group assessed their
113 American Psychological Association, 76th Annual Convention in PROCEEDINGS
545-46 (1968).
114 The study listed two general secondary references-THE MEANING OF DEATH (H.
Feifel ed. 1959), and DEATH AND IDENTITY (R.L. Fulton ed. 1965).
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overall attitude toward death as 'positive' with the physically ill patients
ranking highest in this respect.
"A somewhat contradictory and contrasting picture emerged when
other conscious material and below-the-level-of-awareness measures
were examined. Interviewers' assessments of the patients' attitudes to-
ward death underlined an 'ambivalent' rather than 'positive' outlook.
Forty-four per cent of the population reacted with rejection to the idea
of personal death, with acceptance indicated by only 30%. Analysis
of color-word interference and word-association tests showed greater in-
terference, increased reaction times, and more recall errors on death
than on neutral words. Scrutiny of dying and death imagery data dis-
closed 'negative' imagery as regnant. Further, denial was the major
(63%) coping technique used. . . to deal with the idea of personal
death.
"Certain significant differences were manifest among the groups.
'Own illness' was reliably more important . . . for the patients than
the healthy in bringing death to mind and in making a lasting im-
pression . . . on them. Anxiety and depression characterized the seri-
ously ill and terminally ill patients more than the healthy. The seriously
ill and terminally ill also blocked significantly more often. . . than the
healthy when asked to conceptualize death verbally and graphically.
Additionally, they used denial as a coping defense relevant to death
thoughts reliably more often . . . than the healthy. The healthy, on
their side, resorted to intellectualization as their prevailing coping tech-
nique.115 This does not imply, naturally, that denial was not available
to a substantial number of the healthy or intellectualization to the pa-
tients, not to mention such other shields as reaction formation, isolation
and displacement ...
115 Dr. Feifel supplied some underlying data for this article from the study on the
use of intellectualization and denial as techniques for coping with death:
The percentage of occurrence of denial and intellectualization in the four groups
(I-seriously and terminally ill; 11-chronically ill; rn-mentally ill; IV-normal) as
judged by clinically trained interviewers were as follows:
I Ir rn IV
% Denial 84.8 56.4 51.1 57.9
% Intellect. 47.8 51.1 40.0 56.8
Total N 92 97 90 95
In the case of denial, the difference between groups when adjustments are made for
differences in age, sex, socio-economic status, marital status, intelligence, number of
children, education, and religious denomination, are such that they would occur by
chance less than once in a thousand.
In the case of intellectualization, when the same adjustments are made, the differ-
ences would occur by chance less than once out of 20 times. See also the clinical dis-.
cussion of the denial defense in KR. EIssLEP, supra note 70, at 149, 157-58.
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"Concerning general view of self and the world, no sharp overall
differences among the groups were evident. 'Feel fulfilled' was rated
'yes' by 42%, 'no' by 41%. As expected, however, more of the healthy
reported 'yes' than did mentally ill patients. Self-description was gen-
erally positive, with the mentally ill bringing up the rear. Major per-
sonal assets were designated as 'friendly and sociable' (57%) and
'helpful and sympathetic to others' (52%); major liabilities, 'personal
defects' (57%) and 'lack of emotional contror (39%). The most
important thing in life now was 'health' for the physically ill, 'family'
for the healthy, and 'being a better person' for the mentally ill. The
world itself was delineated as 'OK' (39%) and 'good' (38%), along
with a pronounced minority vote of 'messed up' by the mentally ill. The
path of life ranked highest by all groups emphasized 'integration of di-
versity,' that is, accepting things from all paths of life as needed and ap-
propriate. This was followed closely by the path stressing 'group partici-
pation in achieving common goals.' The paths least favored were 'being
a quiet vessel through whom others work' and 'the rich, inner contem-
plative life.' Passivity and the meditative life as dominant guides were
eschewed.
"Concerning personal fate after death, 55% of the present popula-
tion adopted a religious orientation-the physically ill being more
partial in this direction than the other two groups. The physically ill
also manifested a significantly more . . . 'conventional' religious out-
look than did the others. Nevertheless, scores for all four groups on
this variable centered broadly in the 'average' range. No significant
differences were noted on the intrinsic-extrinsic religious dimension.
Self-rating in the area was primarily 'somewhat religious.' Major rea-
sons for being religious were 'tradition' (31%) and 'belief in God'
(22%); for being nonreligious, 'false teachings' (24%). The impact
of religion on behavior was reported as 'improves me' (48%) and
'makes little difference' (39%).
"Time was considered 'valuable' by most, but also 'meaningless' by
a good proportion of the seriously ill and terminally ill patients. The
'future' was the time period of most concern to the patients, particularly
the seriously ill and terminally ill; the 'present' to the healthy. 'Per-
,,ional gratification' (58%) and 'social orientation' (56%) governed
I he essential use of time under the threat of death.
"Strong contrasts are apparent in attitudes toward death. Both ac-
ceptance and rejection coexist, with acknowledgment and manageable
fear generally commanding verbal conscious considerations, denial and
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dread, the 'gut' level. Avoidance and evasion strategies tend to be-
come intensified, particularly at the nonconscious level, when a person
realizes that death is possible in the near future. Undoubtedly, this
counterpoise serves adaptational needs. This is increasingly under-
standable in an era of dissolving beliefs and traditions when one no
longer possesses unquestioned conceptual creeds which transcend and
integrate death or furnish one with sustaining continuity and meaning.
Nevertheless, it also mirrors unhealthy expulsion and inadequate bind-
ing of fears and anxieties concerning death. Expanded communica-
tion and openness concerning death rather than suppression is called
for in providing emotional support, especially for the seriously ill and
terminally ill. The expressions of gratitude and relief verbalized by
many of the interviewees suggest its pertinence for all. Closer affinity
with the notion of death is required in developmental perspectives. One
also needs to comprehend more penetratingly varying and fluctuating
meanings of death within as well as between individuals. Additionally,
one faces the task of unraveling more intelligibly bonds existing among
verbally expressed ideas, fantasy musings, and unconscious concepts
concerning death."
These data tend to indicate two facts which are contrary to the almost
universal assumptions apparent in Section 2035 opinions: 1) The
most common coping technique for all groups of all ages, and in all
conditions of health, is denial ("I am not going to die"), rather than
intellectualization ("We all die sometime"); 2) The older the subject
is, or the poorer his health, the more likely it is that he will select denial,
rather than intellectualization.
Two caveats might be added to this data: 1) These are just group
statistical findings, i.e., the seriously ill can make use of intellectualiza-
tion just as well as the healthy; they do so, however, significantly less
often; 2) both denial and intellectualization, as coping techniques, can
coexist within the same individual--one does not necessarily exclude
the other-be the individual sick or healthy.
C. By Professor Shaffer
The March opinion is as ambivalent as the Varner opinion is asser-
tive. Since ambivalence is less useful in jurisprudence than it is in psy-
chology, the court is therefore driven to resolving its problem as all
difficult factual problems are resolved by judges-by the application of
a presumption." 6  "Presumption" in this sort of case means a policy
116 See my reports on this phenomenon in judges dealing with juries-Bullets, Bad
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determination to be applied in deciding the unprovable; it is not here
a matter of factual inference.
At least one of the Varner opinion's group norms- Contemplation is
surrender-is implicit here. The court is at some pains to suggest that
all of the things that happened to Mrs. March are consistent with its
(statutory) presumption that she had surrendered to the grim reaper.
Two other of the Varner norms are clearly rejected-Support is only
for life and Dying people withdraw. Aside from these areas of resem-
blance or difference, the mood of the March opinion is uncertainty.
The uncertainty can be stated in terms of five variable principles:
Moral obligations may be satisfied after death. The Varner court,
on solid authority, distinguished between transfers in contemplation
of death and transfers to satisfy moral obligations. March, on al-
most equally solid authority, took the view that satisfaction of moral
obligations is not necessarily a living motive."n1 "Rules", such as they
are in these cases, are like that. There is almost literally no "rule" which
is not, like some sort of law of physics, matched by an equal and oppo-
site contrary "rule". s This phenomenon is familiar in death-related
cases, or at least where the issue turns on the decedent's intent. It is
almost impossible to confront the judiciary with what seems to be a
doctrinal inconsistency, because it is always possible for judges to say
or infer that precedent counts for very little when intention is the central
inquiry.'"0 This rejoinder is used by the judiciary even though it is
perfectly obvious that courts do not, with any sincerity or seriousness,
attempt to find out what was the decedent's intention. The judge in
March is refreshingly candid about that.
Another aspect of moral obligation as producing a life-centered mo-
tive (or ambivalent motive), is the distinction which the facts here
present. Mrs. March seems to have made the transfers to Charles be-
Florins, and Old Boots: A Report of the Indiana Trial Judge's Seminar on the Judge's
Control Over Demonstrative Evidence, 39 NoTRE DAME LAWYER 20 (1963); Appellate
Courts and Prejudiced Verdicts, 26 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1 (1964), in PERSONAL INjuRY
ANNUAL 751 (Frumer & Friedman ed. 1965); Judges, Repulsive Evidence, and the
Ability to Respond, 43 NOTRE DAME LkwyER 503 (1968).
117 Even classifying this as a satisfaction of moral obligation is debatable, of
course. It is possible that Mrs. March reacted out of hurt at Charles' reaction to her at-
tempt to satisfy moral obligation. She withdrew, in a way, and thereby possibly put
herself within Shneidman's "social death" generalization.
118 See legal discussion cited supra note 4.
119 See Schuyler, The Art of Interpretation in Future Interests Cases, 17 VAND.
L. REV. 1407 (1964); Halbach, Stare Decisis and Rules of Construction in Wills and
Trusts, 52 CALiF. L. REv. 921 (1964).
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cause she thought he had been wronged, and to have made the transfers
to Ann to settle a family squabble. The court regards both motivations
as doubtful, and resolves the issue in the case by reference to a pre-
sumption rather than by reference to either motive. If the pre-
sumption were not used, the court might then have to inquire into the
relationship between Mrs. March and each of her children, and this
especially in reference to her relationship with her late husband and to
the apparently radical change in her life which followed the death of
her first child. That sort of inquiry might be characteristic of a serious
attempt to find out her intention. 20 It would undoubtedly have to in-
volve the kind of interdisciplinary inquiry Dr. Redmount suggests.'
The alternative of using a presumption is an easy out-for which the
court cannot be criticized, of course, since Congress provided it. An-
other alternative might be to abandon the venture the Wells case began
nearly forty years ago and have taxation turn on the manifest operation
of transfers rather than on the hidden contents of the hearts of dead men.
Grief reactions color behavior, but it is impossible for judges
to know how they do it. However honest this reaction might have
been-and despite what seems to be Dr. Redmount's acceptance of it-
I suspect that this conclusion is wrong. And the failure is not really
the court's; it belongs on the shoulders of the lawyers who try these cases.
My impression from reading hundreds of Section 2035 cases is that the
estates win them too easily and the Internal Revenue Service does not
aggressively try them. One can read dozens of cases under Section
2035 without detecting the slightest indication that Sigmund Freud and
his precursors ever lived, or the further fact that substantial numbers of
clinical and research psychologists and psychiatrists have devoted vol-
umes of work to death research in the past decade. It is possible to
inquire into the effect of relatively tangible psychological trauma, and
to inquire into it with the clarity and certainty required for judicial de-
cision. Dr. Feifel's exacting work is particularly encouraging on that
score. The inquiry could be undertaken as a result of procedural re-
form, possibly the interdisciplinary board Dr. Redmount recommends.
It could be undertaken within existing procedures by using judicially
noticeable data in Section 2035 trials. There is now, I think, a suffi-
cient body of clinical, experimental and survey research to justify ju-
120 "Intention" can be given a medieval definition in this context: "Intentional
characteristics represent above all else the individual's primary modes of addressing
the future." G.W. ALLPORT, BECOMING at 89 (1955).
121 His fine article, Humanistic Law Through Legal Education, supra note 9, develops
this more fully.
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dicially cognizable scientific opinion in Section 2035 trials. This can be
demonstrated in terms of reported clinicial cases and in terms of reported
research generalizations.
122
Manipulative property transfers may or may not contemplate Death.
This point is nicely illustrated by the court's comparison of its case with
the facts of the Russell'23 case. It was fairly clear in Russell that the
decedent (also a widowed lady) had made transfers so that her children
and grandchildren would be close to her as she grew older. That
was a possible conclusion in March, but it was certainly not inevi-
table. Mrs. March may have wanted her son and daughter emotionally
close to her so that her old age could be spent in satisfaction and
peace, but her motives may have been more indefinite than that.
They may, specifically, have involved a redress of wrongs she felt
her late husband had done; and this in turn may have involved a
manipulation of their emotional attitude toward her and toward their
late father. The operation of a transfer to manipulate affections
would have been important after her death, as well as until her death.
This was very much the government's view, which was sustained
by attempting to attribute to Mrs. March the motives of her chil-
dren. But the government's case apparently presented only legal prece-
dent in support of this psychological conclusion. The government fi-
nally relied on the statutory presumption, which worked out well for
it in this case, but which has failed it more often than not in other cases.
Could the government have offered data from which the judge might
have concluded that Mrs. March's transfers were manipulative, and in
contemplation of her own death?
"Just in case" transfers are in contemplation of death, but may
not be a dominant factor. This principle has a doctrinal side. The
doctrine that transfers "in case anything happens" are in contempla-
tion of death is one of those "principles" Dr. Redmount recognizes
as essential to adjudication. Facts do not have to support a principle
like this with precision. It is sufficient that they seem to come pretty
close to supporting it. It is probably a good doctrine, not so much be-
cause it is invariably correct, as because it is in reasonable approxima-
tion to correctness-as reasonably approximate as any general prin-
122 One might start with H. Feifel, supra note 1; R.L. Fulton, supra note 70;
E.S. Shneidman & N.L. Farberow, supra note 75; and N.L. Farberow & G.W.
Allport, supra note 76. And one should not neglect K.R. EIsSLEIZ, supra note 70, which
is now available in paperback. Federal tax lawyers seem to eschew these subtleties in
favor of trying the decedent as a tax evader. See Robinson v. United States, 8 Am.
Fed. Tax R.2d 6082 (N.D. N.Y. 1961).
123 Russell v. United States, 206 F. Supp. 493 (N.D. 1. 1966), supra note 106 and
accompanying text.
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ciple can be when it is to be applied in every case. But the court, even
though it identifies a useful general principle, fails to apply it because
it finds that factor not dominant on the facts of this case. Again, ulti-
mate decision is based on the statutory presumption rather than on the
facts. Is it possible to separate out donative factors, and to isolate the
dominant one, on the basis of scientific information? If scientific assis-
tance is not acceptable, the alternative is to pile a doctrine (that a given
factor is or is not dominant), on another doctrine (that the factor
designated dominant is a contemplation of death factor).
In a case where the factor is found to be dominant, the considerations
will closely parallel the considerations that Professor Leon Green de-
velops regarding "proximate cause" in tort cases.124 The judiciary will
have delimited a zone of liability, because of policy considerations, with
only indirect allusion (if any at all) to scientific information. In a
case where no factor is designated dominant, the primary doctrine will-
as in this case-have failed its purpose and the case will be decided on
the statutory presumption. If it were possible to sort out and weight
factors scientifically, cases could be decided either on a single doctrine
(that the factor so isolated is a contemplation of death factor), or on the
basis of no doctrine at all (when the factor so isolated is itself capable
of scientific evaluation in terms of contemplation of death). Some of
Dr. Feifel's careful research may very well point to that manner of
weighting factors.125
For example, scientific information might be available to demon-
strate that the "just in case" motivation behind Mrs. March's transfer of
the house was a contemplation of death motive. This information would
be substituted for the use of precedent; facts would be used rather than
policy. And I mean here what Brandeis called "legislative facts"-
facts of the sort developed in Dr. Feifel's research. The court
would then have to decide whether, on the peculiar "judicial facts"
of this case, this motive was dominant. If scientific evidence could
demonstrate that it was or was not dominant, the case would be de-
cided on the basis of facts, in both senses, rather than on the basis of
presumptions and doctrines.
Vindictive transfers may be life-related but they may also be fo-
cally suicidal. This of course overstates what the March court said.
It simply noted that the transfer in Budd seemed to have been sui-
124 L. GREEN, THE RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927); L. GREEN, JUDGE AND
JURY (1930).
125 See Feifel, Death, supra note 76.
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cidal. 126  The Budd case was then declared to be not helpful in re-
solving the issues in the case before the court. But the insight-which
was not stated in the Budd opinion-seems to be useful. It is probably
accurate to say that some inter vivos property transfers are suicidal.
The reasoning would be this: 1) The transferor identified himself in
some significant way with his property, 2) he transferred his property
in a suicidal frame of mind and 3) suicidal frames of mind are within the
statutory phrase "contemplation of death". The first point is a case by
case factual inquiry. The second is a conclusion based on inquiry but
applied more or less generally; it is a "legislative fact". Finally, there
is and has been for a generation a significant amount of psycholog-
ical groundwork for the inquiry; the groundwork is more solid every
year, as clinicians127 and experimenters 2s reach large areas of con-
sensus on suicidal behavior. An exploration of this factor in Section
2035 cases-and in the psychology of testation generally-may be
worthwhile, and may result in the conclusion that psychological infor-
mation on suicidal property transfer would be useful in the general proc-
ess of replacing doctrines and presumptions with facts.
ESTATE OF DUMAY v. COMMISSIONER
1 2 9
(United States Court of Appeals)
John Richard Dumay, had a wife, a son, and a daughter. He also
had a business and a fine old house in the city, a brother who was his
business "angel", and a large policy of life insurance. This appeal deals
with the last days of his life with these people and these things.
Mr. Dumay's life was divided between his home and his business.
At home were his wife Janet and his disabled, unmarried daughter
Millicent. Mr. Dumay spent his weekends in this home environment.
He grew a garden there, an unusual avocation for a businessman who
lived in the city, and he made routine repairs around the house. He
126 See note 87 supra and accompanying text.
127 The leading discussion is in K.A. MENNINGER, MAN AGAINST HIMsELF (1938).
128 Shneidman, supra note 7; E.S. Shneidman & N.L. Farberow, supra note 75;
E.S. Shneidman, Suicide, in N.L. FARBERoW & G.W. ALLPORT, supra note 76;
Shneidman & Farberow, Suicide and Death, in FE EL, supra note 1.
129 This case is based upon the following: Yeazel v. Coyle, 21 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d
1681 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Estate of Hull v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1963);
Estate of Brigid Angela Casey, 25 T.C. 707 (1956); Garrett's Estate v. Commissioner, 180
F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1950); Estate of Ralph Owen Howard, 9 T.C. 1192 (1947); and Kauf-
man v. Reinecke, 68 F.2d 642 (7th Cir. 1934). The names are taken from Iris Murdoch's
novel, THE RED AND THE GREEN (1965). The remainder of the footnotes, through the
end of the opinions, are the court's.
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bought the house, which had been constructed in 1881, in his early
married life, at a time when it was beyond his means. He appears to
have maintained it at considerable sacrifice of other interests which
might have been normal to a man growing in prosperity-business
connections, life at the country club, and some of the status of middle
class respectability. It was and is an impressive house, and Mr. Du-
may undoubtedly had an unusually strong attachment to it (and, we
think, to the people who lived in it).
Mr. Dumay was engaged in the manufacture of embalming fluid.
He entered this business in his youth and took it over when its founder
died in 1934. He built it by thrift and diligence from a tenuous venture
to a respected, dependable concern. Of course, he found the economic
aspects of doing that, difficult. When he took over the business from
its founder's estate he borrowed some $40,000 from his older brother,
then and now a successful real estate broker in California. When he
expanded it in 1938, he returned to his brother for financing. His
brother observed that none of the principal of the 1934 loan had been
paid, and Mr. Dumay countered with an offer to discharge the 1934
debt and cover new capital by incorporating the business and giving his
brother one-third of the stock. His brother agreed to this arrangement
and has retained 333 shares of the 1,000 shares of outstanding stock in
the company since 1938.
As part of this 1938 transaction, Mr. Dumay and his brother, Arthur
Dumay, entered into a cross-purchase buy-sell agreement. This was
a simple arrangement, apparently set up as an afterthought to the
larger transaction, and probably traceable to the diligence and thorough-
ness of counsel who supervised the transaction. In any event, the agree-
ment provided that either shareholder had a right of first purchase at
book value of the other shareholder's holdings at death, and in the event
either shareholder sought to sell any of his holdings to an outsider.18 0
This agreement would have required that the estate offer all of the
stock in the corporation to Arthur Dumay at book value. The evidence
is that book value of these shares is $150 and that their fair market
value, although disputed, is at least $600 a share.
The business prospered after 1938. Mr. Dumay was able to pay
himself an adequate salary as its president, reinvest earnings and put
the company on a solid footing. He did not move from his house,
when his circumstances might have so dictated, and he continued to
130 The parties have stipulated as controlling value for estate-tax purposes the value
specified in the agreement.
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live the simple life he had always led. He did not invest his personal
savings in either frivolity or the stock market, but he did buy a $100,000
life insurance policy in 1954, and completed payment of the premiums
within three years. That life insurance policy, the house and two-thirds
of the stock in the family business are at issue in this appeal.
Mr. Dumay's relationship with his family was apparently normal. His
son, Brian, attended college and law school and became an attorney in
his home city. His daughter, Millicent, suffered a tragic automobile
accident while in college, which left her disabled and disfigured and,
as it turned out, indefinitely dependent on her loving father. She lived
in the parental home until her father's death, and still lives in it. She
is not employed but is able to "do things" around the house and to help
her mother. It is reasonable to infer that the purchase of life insur-
ance in 1954, the year after Millicent's accident, was related to Mr.
Dumay's concern for her welfare.
In 1964, Mr. Dumay discussed his business situation with his son,
Brian. The gist of that conversation was that Mr. Dumay needed help
with the expanding business, that he hoped to reduce the time he spent
in his work and devote more time to his garden and home, and that he
could offer Brian a secure future in the business. He orally offered
Brian managerial authority and a share in the business if Brian would
give up his law practice and devote all of his time to the company.
Brian accepted this proposition and, since early 1966, has been secre-
tary and general manager of the company. His father remained active
in the office, however, and until his death was president of the corpora-
tion. Mr. Dumay died December 10, 1967.
Mr. Dumay did not immediately transfer stock to Brian, as he had
promised, and Brian (with support from Mrs. Dumay and from Milli-
cent) pressed his father to begin stock transfers in performance of the
bargain. There is no evidence that this pressure was either protracted
or intense, but there is no doubt, either, that it was a matter which
weighed in some way on Mr. Dumay's mind, and on the minds of
Brian, Millicent and Mrs. Dumay.
In 1965, Mr. Dumay consulted an attorney for "estate planning"
services. This attorney pointed out that Mr. Dumay's death would re-
sult in the sale of his corporate shares to his brother for about a
fourth of their value; that the house would, under local law, be divided
among wife, daughter, and son; and that the insurance proceeds would
be given entirely to the wife, as beneficiary. He also pointed out that
the cross-purchase agreement with Arthur Dumay was binding only as
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to inter vivos sales and to disposition at death. Mr. Dumay, in other
words, was free to give the shares away during his life.
Mr. Dumay's situation at that time was typical of many businessmen
of his age (sixty-four). His son had promise and a good future in the
family business, and Mr. Dumay was frequently reminded of general and
specific obligations toward him. His wife and daughter, on the other
hand, were in need of continued support and protection, and were of
no economic value in the business. His attorney advised him that any
planned transfer of corporate shares to Brian should be undertaken
promptly, so that those shares would be removed from the cross-pur-
chase agreement with Arthur Dumay; that the life insurance policy
afforded protection for Mr. Dumay's wife and daughter, but that it
should be removed from the risks of the business (which it bore so
long as Mr. Dumay owned it); and that Mr. Dumay could and should
take steps to guarantee that the family home would be controlled by
his wife and daughter.
Mr. Dumay did not act on this advice for more than two years.
There is no clear evidence explaining the delay, but we assume the sort
of procrastination familiar to any lawyer who draws wills. In any
event, Mr. Dumay returned to his lawyer in 1967 to relate the fact that
he had transferred the shares of stock-all 667 of them-to Brian,
and that he wanted "to take care of the house and life insurance."
Within a week, the lawyer prepared, and Mr. Dumay executed, a
conveyance of the house to Mrs. Dumay and a conveyance of the insur-
ance policy to a non-removable trustee. The trustee was directed to ap-
ply insurance proceeds to the support of Mrs. Dumay so long as she lived,
and then to the support of Millicent. Mr. Dumay did not, however,
make a will. He died intestate six weeks later.
Mr. Dumay's death was sudden. He was not unusually old and
had not been ill until stricken shortly before he died. He had been
under the care of a physician, for arthritis, but this ailment was not
serious. He had not consulted a physician otherwise, except for routine
physical examinations (which he had taken since early in his life once a
year, and took in the last three years of his life four times a year).
The cause of death was listed as "short term coronary thrombosis."
The question here is whether those three transfers-the stock (approx-
imately $400,000); the house (approximately $85,000); and the in-
surance policy (worth about $65,000 at transfer) were gifts in contem-
plation of death under Section 2035 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954. The Commissioner prevailed in the Tax Court as to the house
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transfer and as to the insurance transfer. The Tax Court found for the
taxpayer on the stock transfer. Both the Commissioner and the estate
have appealed.
The stock. We affirm the Tax Court and hold that the transfer of
stock was not in contemplation of death. The test, we think, is that
suggested by the court in Lockwood v. United States:' "The ques-
tion is whether the decedent made this gift for a purpose which would
reasonably be effected during the lifetime of the decedent, or is the gift
a substitute for testamentary disposition."' 82  In that case, as here, the
purpose was one which could not possibly be effected after the dece-
dent's death. In Lockwood, the motive was saving income taxes; here
it was placing property beyond the operation of an agreement which
could only have operated after death. This is the usual holding where
income taxes, as distinguished from death taxes, appear to be the dece-
dent's principal concern. 3 3  This is altogether different from the result
where saving of death taxes is indicated as a dominant motive.
3 4
The government argues that Mr. Dumay delayed the conveyance of
these securities until the imminence of death added a decisive considera-
tion to those motives he already had. The government points to three
factors: 1) the desire to avoid the buy-sell agreement (a living motive),
2) the desire to transfer the business to the son (a death motive), and 3)
the desire to retire from the business (an ambivalent motive which is ar-
131 181 F. Supp. 748 (S.D. N.Y. 1959).
132 Id. at 750.
183 In Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Tait, 3 F. Supp. 51 (D. Md. 1933), af-'d 70
F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1933), an income-tax saving, on advice of counsel, of about 20 per-
cent, was held to override even evidence of age and ill health. Estate of Annie F.
Howell, 1 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 481 (1943); Estate of Salim Ackel, 17 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 110 (1958); and Estate of Florence M. Harrison, 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 776
(1958), are similar. Here health and attitude were good-see Estate of Charles J.
Rosebault, 12 T.C. 1 (1949)-which adds, as in Estate of May Hicks Sheldon, 27 T.C.
194 (1956), a potent additional factor. See Commissioner v. Hofheimer's Estate, 149
F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1945); Rowe v. Fahs, 54-2 U.S. Tax Cas. para. 10,955 (S.D. Fla.
1954). Poor v. White, 8 F. Supp. 995 (D. Mass. 1934); Vaughan v. Riordan, 280 F.
742 (W.D. N.Y. 1921); Estate of Carrie L. Minzesheimer, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 760
(1954); Estate of Jennie E. Hinde, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 55 (1952); Estate of Charles
F. Haley, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 805 (1951); Estate of Anna S. Farnum, 14 T.C. 884
(1950); Estate of Mary E. Cook, 9 T.C. 563 (1947); Estate of Louis Bendet, 5 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 302 (1946); Estate of Anna T. Stinchfield, 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 511
(1945).
134 Vanderlip v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 152, 154 (2d Cir. 1946) (L. Hand, I.):
(A] donor, interested in saving [estate] taxes, is not concerned with the
donee's enjoyment while he himself lives; he is interested in relieving his legatees
from taxes after he dies, and, not only may his legatees not be the donees, but
when they are, their relief will not concern their enjoyment of the property while
he lives. Such a motive is necessarily testamentary ....
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guably made a death motive by a process of morbid contamination).
We think the government places too much emphasis on its own con-
jecture. Transfers of business, during life, to the next generation, are
not necessarily testamentary. In Estate of T. M. Flynn,8 " the court con-
sidered the fact that the objectives of retirement and new business
management could have been accomplished by some method other than
stock transfer, but held that the decedent was not bound to choose
non-transfer methods in order to avoid Section 2035. Nor was it enough
that the decedent obviously must have had in mind the continuation of
the business after his death. The jury charge in Estate of Mollenkamp
v. United States86 was even more emphatic: "[I]f the transferor . . .
desired to avoid the cares and burdens of continuing to manage the
property. . . such a purpose would be consistent with the enjoyment
of life. .. . Whether the court's language is stronger than an ob-
jective consideration of the precedents would justify, is unimportant in
this case. We have here additional evidence of living motive, especially
evidence that Mr. Dumay, who was in good health and not unusually
old, planned to devote his time and energies to home and garden rather
than to business. What he seems to have contemplated, in other words,
was a transition in his life, not a transition out of his life.
188
Another factor, Mr. Dumay's delay in effecting the transfer, explains
the government's argument on the stock. Mr. Dumay was reluctant
to turn over his business, even when it was explained to him that failure
to do so would frustrate his plans with respect to his son in the business.
That reluctance was understandable as it did relate to the surrender
of his life's work. That was a momentous event for him, one he
came to slowly, but not, we think, necessarily one that can be explained
only by an apprehension toward death. Here, as in Estate of Meyer
Goldberg,18 9 his attitude toward his son, toward his retirement, and
toward the buy-sell agreement, all point toward living motives for the
135 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1287 (1944).
136 11 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1819 (D. Kan. 1963).
137 Id. at 1821. This is not like Estate of Joseph E. Goar, 9 CCH Tax CL Mom. 854
(1950), where the court felt the dominant motive was post-death support for children
and discounted the probative value of evidence that the decedent was concerned
about the management of his business.
138 This may resemble anthropological information about certain primitive farmers
who gradually turn over parts of their farms to their sons as they retire. See Estate
of Marshall G. Pearson, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 296, 297 (1952), where the court
held that the transfers there were not in contemplation of death: "'The decedent en-
joyed life, resented being thought of as old and never spoke of death." See also Estate of
Baxter v. United States, 22 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 6047 (E.D. Ark. 1968).
139 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 977 (1951).
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delay, rather than death motives. We do not believe that this case falls
within the well established line of authorities which equate "gift in
contemplation of death" with "testamentary transfer". 140 It falls in-
stead within precedents which overcome that conclusion-and even
sometimes strain a bit to do it-with evidence that there was more in
the transfer than merely testamentary motivation. 14 1
The life insurance. We reverse the Tax Court and find that the
transfer of life insurance to the trust was not in contemplation of death.
The dominant motive in this situation-a motive which realistically dates
from the purchase of the insurance, and which was merely carried one
step further in the transfer of it, was provision for the support of Mr.
Dumay's disabled daughter Millicent. 42 It is true that life insurance
transfers seem by their nature to be death-centered, since the insurance
will not usually ripen into any sort of economic benefit for anyone until
the insured is dead. But an insured may purchase or maintain insur-
ance because he wants to have economic protection for the support of
his family which is not subject to business risk.143  It is possible, and
we think the case here, for him to transfer ownership of existing in-
surance in order to increase and protect that economic immunity144
This is a case where concern for support overcomes concern for death
(which means that the statute compels us to assume the existence of
concern for death and then determine whether evidence of other concern
overcomes this concern). The life insurance trust is a familiar device.
In Estate of Samuel Want,145 the decedent was concerned about the
physical care of an infant daughter. In Colorado Bank v. Commis-
sioner,146 the presence of an adult dependent daughter was determina-
tive, and it was stated, "Broadly speaking, thoughtful men habitually
act with regard to ultimate death, but something more than this is re-
quired in order to show that a conveyance comes within the ambit of the
statute."'147 There is, in other words, a difference between disposing of
140 Pate v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d 669 (8th Cir. 1945); Koch v. Commissioner, 146
F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1944); Smails v. O'Malley, 127 F.2d 410 (8th Cir. 1942).
141 Welch v. Hassett, 90 F.2d 833 (1st Cir. 1937), affd 303 U.S. 303 (1938);
Lippincott v. Commissioner, 72 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1934); Shwab v. Doyle, 269 F. 321
(6th Cir. 1920); Estate of Charlotte A. Hopper, 22 T.C. 138 (1954); Estate of Gene-
vieve Brady Macaulay, 3 T.C. 350 (1944).
142 The distinction between purchase and transfer was determinative in Aaron's
Estate v. Commissioner, 224 F.2d 314 (3d Cir. 1955).
143 Estate of Achille F. Israel, 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1301 (1944).
144 Estate of Edmund W. Mudge, 27 T.C. 188 (1956).
145 29 T.C. 1223 (1958).
146 305 U.S. 23 (1938).
147 Id. at 27.
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property as in a will and disposing of property as one would provide
for the medical expenses of a dependent child. This is true even though
the provision may have an effect after the parent is dead.148
The house. Two factors compel us to affirm the Tax Court and to
hold that Mr. Dumay's transfer of the house to his wife and daughter
was a gift in contemplation of death. First, we can find no non-testa-
mentary purpose in the transfer. He could have accomplished the same
result by making a will. Second, we think the evidence shows an at-
tachment, or an involvement, with this asset which is more intense
and more personal than his involvement with his business shares or
with his life insurance. This involvement leads us to conclude that
his transfer was death-centered.
It seems that property owners have a stronger personal identity with
residential (or agricultural) real property than they have with relatively
impersonal economic interests in business and insurance investments.
Mr. Dumay was in every way an old-fashioned householder, the sort of
man who takes pride in discharging a mortgage quickly, in growing a
handsome garden, and in remaining in his home even after industrial ex-
pansion and changing neighborhood patterns have driven his more tran-
sient neighbors into the suburbs. Why then did he give his home
away? There seem to be three explanations: 1) He wanted the home
to be immediately and easily available to his wife and daughter (a
"how to avoid probate" motive which is inherently testamentary), 2)
he wanted the home to be available to them and not to his son, who
did not live in it. He may also have intended an equalization for the
stock transfer to his son, and 3) he had begun to think of the home as
less the place where he would live than the place where his wife and
daughter would live.
All three possible explanations seem to point to the application of
the statute. There is some authority to the effect that transfers "to
make sure the property stays in the family" are not death-motive
148 Clear testamentary equivalence should result in judgment for the Government.
Pate v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d 669 (8th Cir. 1945); Oliver v. Bell, 103 F.2d 760 (3d
Cir. 1939); Purvin v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1938); Anneke v. Willcuts, 1
F. Supp. 662 (D. Minn. 1932); Estate of Jacob C. Gidwitz, 14 T.C. 1263 (1950), aff'd
Commissioner v. Gidwitz's Estate, 196 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1952); but see Estate of Anna
S. Farnum, 14 T.C. 884 (1950). However, time, or concern for support, or the size of the
gift, may indicate a contrary result. Denniston v. Commissioner, 106 F.2d 925 (3d Cir.
1939); Routzahn v. Brown, 95 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1938); Estate of Charles T. Smith,
1 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 518 (1943).
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transfers. 140  But that authority seems to us wrong. The only way
property leaves a family, in circumstances such as these, is when
the owner dies and it is given to persons outside the family. Con-
cern over that eventuality seems precisely a matter of concern about
what will happen to property at death. There is some resemblance be-
tween the situation in which we find Mr. Dumay when he transferred
his house and the man who disposes, inter vivos, of virtually everything
he owns. In the latter case, the courts have almost uniformly held
that the transfer was in contemplation of death.150 Without applying
that kind of quantification to Mr. Dumay, we think the same result
follows here. Real estate transfers seem especially indicative of this
death-centered transfer-as in MacDonald v. United States.-5' There,
the court directed the jury to consider, in a case involving transfer of
real estate, "the amount of property transferred in proportion to the
amount of property retained." 52  In Heiner v. Donnan, 53 the court
reached an opposite conclusion but was impressed that the transfer re-
lated to residential real estate.
The insight attempted here is that there are circumstances in which a
decedent seems to have obliterated a part of his personality, a sort of
"property-personality". It seems likely to occur, and to have occurred
here, since the subject of transfer is a home in which the decedent
was doubtless personally involved. This should explain our motive
in using precedents which involve transfers of all the decedent's prop-
erty. Both circumstances suggest an obliteration of property, logically
related to death, more than they suggest a calculated dispensation of,
or expenditure of, property.
149 Estate of Selnes v. United States, 1 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 2141, 2145 (D. Minn.
1957).
150 In Stubblefield v. United States, 6 F. Supp. 440 (Ct. Cl. 1934), which involved a
similar situation, the decedent was almost unbalanced in the literal obliteration of his
property ownership. This sort of obliteration was determinative in Buckminster's Es-
tate v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1944); Northern Trust Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 116 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1940); Purvin v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 929 (7th Cir.
1938); Updike v. Commissioner, 88 F.2d 807 (8th Cir. 1937), relying on Igleheart v.
Commissioner, 77 F.2d 704 (5th Cir. 1935), and on Rengstorff v. McLaughlin, 21 F.2d
177 (N.D. Cal. 1927); and in Tait v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 74 F.2d 851 (4th Cir.
1935). Welch v. Hassett, 15 F. Supp. 692 (D. Mass. 1936), rev'd on other grounds 90
F.2d 833 (1st Cir. 1937), affd 303 U.S. 303 (1938), and Lippincott v. Commissioner,
72 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1934), are to the contrary but seem to turn on special circum-
stances. See Koch v. Commissioner, 146 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1944); Llewellyn v. United
States, 40 F.2d 555 (D. Tenn. 1929); Vaughan v. Riordan, 280 F. 742 (W.D.N.Y.
1921); and Gaither v. Miles, 268 F. 692 (D. Md. 1920).
1'1 12 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 6191 (E.D. Tenn. 1956).
152 Id. at 6194.
153 61 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1932), rev'd 285 U.S. 312 (1932).
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We therefore find that: 1) the transfer of securities was not in
contemplation of death, 2) the transfer of life insurance ownership to
the trust was not in contemplation of death, and 3) the transfer of
residential real estate was in contemplation of death.
COMMENTARY ON ESTATE OF DUMAY V. COMMISSIONER
A. By Dr. Redmount
The court in Dumay appears to show a rare intelligence about hu-
man behavior, even though it may not have conveyed this intelligence in
terms of some systematic framework of behavior explanation. It rec-
ognizes, as have other courts, that there is a dominance of motives in
relation to acts. A decision about a stock transfer is not a matter of
either life motives or death motives. Both may be relevant and the
question is which kind of motive is substantially stronger.
The court also recognizes that vital decisions about one's self in rela-
tion to one's family and in relation to one's wealth or property (an exten-
sion of personality) do not come easily. In fact, decisions may be piece-
meal and delayed. The manner in which the decisions are formed and
expressed may reflect indecision and uncertainty extended in time rather
than clear and consistent contemplation followed by decisive action.
This appears to be the case in Dumay's handling of his business
transfers and perhaps his home transfer as well. The court recognized
the true significance of delayed and seemingly belated decisions that
all too glibly might have been construed as fear, panic or concern be-
cause of the imminence of death. The court, in fact, is ahead of the
psychology of its time in recognizing and differentiating the importance
of property of various kinds as an important attribute of personality
around which or through which some needs, feelings, thoughts and
actions grow. It offers the pregnant thought that a person's attach-
ment to his residential property is heavily invested with acquisitive,
possessive or protective feelings much like some of his attachment to
his family. The court suggests, correctly or not, that this is not as true
or vital in the case of a person's interest in his business, commercial
investments and the like.
The essential thrust of the court's style of thinking can be put in the
form of a sound proposition. The character and purpose, the timing
and direction, and the meaning of a person's actions are validly compre-
hended only in terms of a cohering system of behavior. One must
understand, or at least appreciate, the person's system of needs, his
modes of expressing or revealing himself, his ideas about life and his
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feelings and practices relating to family, to career, to property and
wealth, to health and other such considerations. One must contem-
plate all of these in relation to one another before he can make mean-
ingful and reliable statements about any facet or facets in the per-
son's life. This approach and analysis the court approximates in the
Dumay case, though it does not articulate a systematic framework of
behavior. It acts more intelligently than many and perhaps most other
courts where the judicial vogue is to take a behavioral event, roughly
isolated, and then make fragmented and spurious speculations about
persons and other matters relating to and deriving from the event.
B. By Professor Shaffer
The judicial sophistication which Dr. Redmount finds in the Dumay
opinion is a composite of insights from a relatively small number of
cases. It is accurate analyzation of real judicial behavior. But it is
an aspiration too, because it represents a stronger concentration of psy-
chological insight than I have found in any one opinion. It also sug-
gests a limit-it is as far into psychological inquiry as the judiciary is
likely to go. In reference to Dr. Redmount's observation that the judges
in Dumay "may not have conveyed this intelligence in terms of some sys-
tematic framework of behavior examination," I think it unlikely that
American judges will ever be open about their adherence to systematic
psychological examination. But I think they can engage in psycho-
logical examination more frequently and more deeply than they have in
most Section 2035 cases.
The Dumay opinion exemplifies what judges can do, and do well,
when they are commissioned to divine human feeling. This is illus-
trated in three respects: 1) The court identified a relationship be-
tween John Richard Dumay and his property. 2) It recognized that
this relationship varied depending on what the property was, and how
owning and giving it affected human relationships in Dumay's family.
3) It began to move towards some understanding of the role property
plays in attitudes towards death. In this case, it seems to have realized
judicially what Drs. Weisman and Hackett have realized clinically in
their "appropriate death" concept. 54 My discussion of these points
may serve as a summary of this venture into the judicial use of the
psychological autopsy.
Property relationship. Dumay, observes the court, had a per-
sonal relationship with the three kinds of property he transferred.
154 See Weisman & Hackett, supra note 70.
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Seemingly, there are several levels at which this insight might have
been worked out in Dumay's life and death. The unifying factor would
have been that all of his property was centrally involved in what psy-
chologists would regard as Dumay's ego life, in his conscious living.
Some of his property might have been involved in his life as a part of
himself, a personal extension. An example of that might have been
Dumay's favorite hammer or saw, the tools he used in his garden, or
the desk fixtures which he had on his desk throughout his business
career.155 I have tried to demonstrate elsewhere that property held
in this intensely personal way is not seen as economically significant
but is regarded almost as a physical extension of the self.""0 This per-
sonal character seems to have extended in this case to Dumay's house,
not only on the symbolic level, as representing something in his life,
but also on the level of identity. In a very real way the house was Dumay
and Dumay was the house.'5 7  And those of us who think we under-
stand the testamentary behavior of clients requesting wills, might add
that the house is Dumay now, long after his death.
There are less intense levels of identity with property. The business
shares, for example, seem not to have a quality of personal extension.
I believe this sort of asset is best described in a client's life as repre-
senting his work, and I have found indications that clients in Dumay's
situation tend to regard their family businesses less as assets (economic
value) or personal things (identity) than as projects (what they do).
If that is true-and the court's opinion assumes that it is-Dumay's
disposition of the business shares may be related to his interest in
having the work continued, and in this sense his work is a part of
his life. His work life ended at retirement. Retirement can be a
traumatic event, but absent a psychopathology which is probably prev-
alent in our society, it is not necessarily a death-related trauma.
The life insurance seems to have been seen by the court as occupying
a third kind of property relationship in Dumay's life. If the house was
a matter of personality, and the business a matter of personal project,
the insurance was a matter of personal power. It is possible for a man
to be in a "doing" relationship with one part of his property and in a
155 Shaffer, Psychology of Testation, 108 ThusTs Am EsTATES 11 (1969), at-
tempts to establish a theoretical basis for this. See also Shaffer, Will Interviews, Young
Family Clients, and the Psychology of Testation, 44 NoT DANME LAWYER 345 (1969).
156 Will Interviews, Young Family Clients, and The Psychology of Testation,
supra note 155.
157 Jung, The Soul and Death, in H. FEEFEL, supra note 1, at 3, finds special sig-
nificance in houses as death-related property extensions, as does K.R. EissLER, supra
note 70, at 130.
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"power" relationship with another. A "pure" capitalist, for instance,
would probably not occupy either a personal relationship or a project
relationship with his shares of stock in public corporations. But he
might be in a personal relationship with them in the sense that capital
is a source of power with which he can provide for and influence the
lives of others. If that was true as to Dumay's life insurance, and the
court appears to have treated it that way, then the question is whether
his transfer of it related to the lives of others during Dumay's life, or
to their lives after his death. The court, fairly, it seems to me, decided
on the former characterization.
In each of these senses property has become real and personal in the
life of the dead man. In some sense each of these aggregations of
things has been loved, and in being loved has become real, like the
toys in the children's story:158
'What is REAL?' asked the Rabbit one day, when they were lying
side by side near the nursery fender ...
'Real isn't how you are made,' said the Skin Horse. 'It's a thing
that happens to you. When a child loves you for a long, long time,
not just to play with, but REALLY loves you, then you become
Real.'
'[O]nce you are Real you can't become unreal again. It lasts for
always.'
Differences in property relationships. The court assumed a per-
sonal relationship between Dumay and his property, and built upon the
assumption, a theory for treating each of the three assets differently.
There is no other way to explain its three part decision (and I repeat at
this point that its three part decision fairly represents one kind of ju-
dicial behavior in Section 2035 cases). The two ways one might ex-
plain the psychological process of differentiation are in terms of giving
as goal-striving behavior, and in terms of death as something Dumay
did rather than something that happened to him.
Property disposition is goal-striving behavior. It could be that death
is a necessary condition in the goal towards which the donor is directing
his effort. This is true when one makes a will; it is often true when one
purchases life insurance. 159 Purchasing life insurance, however, may
have lifetime objectives and its transfer, as in this case, may conduce to
protection or isolation from lifetime activity.
The court seems to have considered these factors in deciding that
168 "The Velveteen Rabbit," by Margery Williams Bianco.
'59 Briggs, The Psychology of Successful Persuasion, C.L.U. Journal, April 1967,
at 49; July 1967, at 59; April 1968, at 51.
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Dumay's goal in transferring the business was related to his retirement,
his promise to his son, and his desire to maintain the family business.
These factors are also involved in the court's deciding that the iso-
lation of life insurance and the equalization of patrimony were related
to lifetime goals more than they were related to objectives to be ac-
complished after Dumay's death. One can disagree with the results
in cases such as this without disapproving of the psychological con-
siderations involved.
The court did not do what courts commonly do when faced with
significant human motivations. It did not ignore its own behavioral
insight and decide the case on unstated, even unconscious assumptions
which are patently unsound. The scores of decisions like Varner,
which regard frantic physical activity and frenetic travel as evidence
of life-centered motivation, belong under that indictment. 10
The Dumay court did not, on the other hand, surrender its decision
to the "experts". That would have added a new chapter to the long
unwholesome list of judicial problems which are falsely centered on a
misuse of psychiatric and psychological information. The gift in con-
templation of death problem is a legal problem; if psychology is relevant
to its solution, it is a psychology which is embedded in the legal prob-
lem and which must be understood and applied by the officers who are
commissioned to solve legal problems. Psychology is indispensable in
bringing data to the process, but psychology as it is presently derived
in the adversary system, through adversary expert witnesses, often di-
lutes its scientific integrity, and does not serve the law well.101 This is
not to disagree with Dr. Redmount's creative suggestion that courts seek
the cooperation of behavioral scientists in solving factual problems in
cases which involve human behavior. It is to disagree with the common
reaction that the solution to problems which fairly involve psychological
science is to assign the decision to competing expert witnesses. One
sound alternative would be to develop general legislative and judicial
policies around the available "legislative facts" on the way people de-
velop and act upon their attitudes toward death. Dr. Redmount's
suggestion aims, instead, at evidentiary fact finding, but neither sug-
gestion involves the expert witness.
Appropriate death. "[Tjhe purpose of living," according to Weis-
man and Hackett, "is to create a world in which we would be will-
160 See notes 74-76 supra and accompanying text.
161 Halleck, The Psychiatrist and the Legal Process, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, February
1969, at 25.
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ing to die."' 62  And an appropriate death is a death in that kind
of world. It is a death which the dying man sees and accepts as his
own. This insight is at work in the Dumay opinion, particularly when
the court discusses the transfer of the house. The house is seen as
involved in Dumay's appropriate death.
Weisman and Hackett developed their concept after three years of
clinical psychiatric practice at the surgical wards of Massachusetts Gen-
eral Hospital. It is the product of the thorough examination of five cases.
The five cases are a composite of some 600 consultations. Each of the
five patients analyzed had a predilection of death and a realistic accept-
ance of death. The predilection was not necessarily psychopathological
because the patient was firmly convinced of approaching death. Not
only did he regard it as appropriate, but its impendency was accompanied
by little depression and no anxiety. These were not cases of psychic
death, where anxiety (at, for instance, imminent surgery) causes death.
The predilection patient had, on the contrary, come to terms with life and
with people. His attitude was the opposite of suicidal, even though
some of the patients suffered intensely and without hope of survival.
They were people who knew and accepted the imminence of death,
and sometimes even the time and manner of death. One of these re-
sisted his psychiatrist's attempts to console him and, "he considered it
strange that anyone should attempt to talk him out of death when every-
thing in his experience pointed to its appropriateness at this point in his
life."' 63  It was almost characteristic of these patients that family and
physicians were the ones who needed to be consoled. It was often the
patient himself who acted as consoler.
Death in these cases was not necessarily related to the ailment which
caused hospitalization. One patient was being treated for cancer, but
died of a heart attack. Another was being treated for bone fractures
and died of pulmonary embolism.
These patients accepted dying as part of living and participated in
their own deaths. "Life as it is lived has more parameters than there
are laboratory methods available to use them; death encompasses the
human personality as much as life does."' 64  The evidence is that the
distinction between dying and living gradually fades in this sort of
"natural" (human?) death, and that anxieties about death, fantasies of
162 Weisman & Hackett, supra note 70 at 328.
163 Id. at 302; see the discussions of Weisman and Sato after Shneidman, Orienta-
tions Towards Death: A Vital Aspect of the Study of Lives, 2 INTmNATIONAL JouRNAL
ol? PsYCHmATRY 167, 190, 196 (1966).
164 Weisman & Hackett, supra note 70 at 311.
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rescue from it, depression and suicidal impulses also fade.
Weisman and Hackett accept the Freudian dogma that it is impossible
to conceive of oneself as dead. This makes it difficult for them to
explain how the appropriate-death phenomenon works. The explana-
tion they choose is derived from their conclusion that subjective death
(death seen as happening to me, and not simply as a process but as a
subjective reality)165 always involves some fantasy of survival. "If there
is some meaning or emotion in the phrase, 'When I am dead,' there
is also a trace of psychological survival in which T continue to exercise
an influence in some form or other. . . . The notion of 'I am dead' is
a paradox."'' 06
An interesting instance of this among their patients was a career
woman who felt humiliated by her illness and who welcomed death
because it would restore her dignity. With this explanation, Weisman
and Hackett see the appropriate death as involving these features: 107
1) [Tlhere is quiet acceptance that death is a solution to abiding
problems, or that few problems remain at the time of death; 2) super
ego demands [the demands of conscience] are reduced; 3) optimal in-
terpersonal relations are maintained; and 4) the ego [consciousness]
is encouraged to operate at as high a level as may be compatible with
the physical illness.
"Appropriate death" is therefore, in their view, a uniquely personal
way to approach the grim reaper. Everyone's death is (or can be)
.his own. This scientific conclusion supports the federal judiciary's at-
tempt to resolve gift in contemplation of death cases one at a time, in
what we have been calling a psychological autopsy. It may not, of
course, support the legislative wisdom of imposing the pathologist's of-
fice on judges.
The court in this third composite case appears to have thought
that John Richard Dumay died an appropriate death, a death in which
the house transfer was central to his predilection. The court, without
any systematic disclosure of its psychological processes, appears to have
concluded that Dumay calmly accepted his death. It further con-
cluded that he saw it as problem-resolving rather than problem-creating;
105 Id. They see death as personified in any one of three ways: (1) impersonal
("it", a corpse, is dead), (2) interpersonal ("he", a person, is dead), and (3) intra-
personal ('T', a subject, am dead). This last category has a dual aspect, which they
treat as (a) attitudes toward the process of dying and (b) attitudes toward subjective
death.
100 Id. at 317.
107 Id. at 324.
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that he was not found to be tense or anxious or ambivalent about it;
that he maintained "optimal interpersonal relations" with those he loved
as the end of his life approached; and that he continued to live his
conscious life at a high level.
Appropriate death rests on some personal conception of immortality
on what Weisman and Hackett see as a survival fantasy, and on what
Shneidman treats as the post-self concept. That part of Dumay's death
seems to have involved his house and plans in reference to his house
which were psychologically similar to "will making", that is, to testamen-
tary activity.
The court seems to have been sound, as a matter of judicial policy,
in holding that testamentary activity is in contemplation of death. The
mistake other courts have made is in adopting the view that con-
templation of death activity is always testamentary. The statutory
concept is seemingly broader. But Dumay is seen as being well within
both concepts. The court sees him as being attached to his children and
anxious to provide for them appropriately (for his daughter's care and
for his son's business future). As previously noted, he was personally
involved with his house; it was somehow a part of, an extension of,
his personality.'1 8  In giving it to his wife and daughter he reached
out to them and expressed love and concern for them, and envisioned
168 Here is the kind of judicial insight I have in mind, from Kengel v. United
States, 57 F.2d 929, 935 (Ct. Cl. 1932):
It is abundantly proved that Joseph Kengel was a frugal and astute businessman;
he knew full well the value of property and the consequences which might fol-
low his parting irrevocably with title to the same. . . . [AInd as we view it [he]
must have appreciated what it meant to him to deed it to another; a transaction of
such consequences to such an active, careful, and prudent man justifies the in-
ference, to say the least, that the time had arrived when he confidently believed
he would have no further use for it.
See also Welch v. Hassett, 15 F. Supp. 692 (D. Mass. 1936), rev'd on other grounds,
90 F.2d 833 (1st Cir. 1937), alf'd 303 U.S. 303 (1938); Estate of E. Coray Henry, 16
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 352 (1957).
It is important to distinguish this view of death as appropriate from what Shneid-
man calls social death. The two are opposites; one is realistic and one not. With-
drawal, social death, is neurotic. C. JUNG, PSYCHOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS 291 (J. Jacobi
ed. 1961);
The neurotic who tries to escape from the necessities of life gains nothing and
only takes upon his shoulders the fearful burden of age and death tasted in ad-
vance, which must be especially cruel because of the total emptiness and point-
lessness of his life. When the libido is denied a progressive life which also desires
all dangers and decay, then it follows the other road and buries itself in its own
depths ...
The predeliction patient sees death coming when it really is coming. He, in a way,
welcomes it. C. JUNG, MODERN MAN IN SEARCH OF A SOUL 112 (Harvest ed. 1933):
I am convinced that it is hygenic-if I may use the word to discover in death a
goal towards which one can strive; and that shrinking away from it is something
unhealthy and abnormal which robs the second half of life of its purpose.
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a human relationship with them (care at least, and maybe love), which
would survive his own death. This was an example of the manner in
which a will can implement the testator's plans, and the court accepted
it in that spirit. The house transfer was an appropriate part of Du-
may's appropriate death, just as his growing vegetables or painting the
front door was an appropriate part of his life.
CONCLUSION
Four purposes were suggested at the beginning of this article, any
one or more of which I thought might be served by applying the psy-
chological autopsy to cases under Section 2035. The first of these pur-
poses related to the wisdom of retaining a provision taxing "gifts in
contemplation of death." A conclusion on that score is relatively sim-
ple: Section 2035 is troublesome and wasteful. It has probably not
produced enough revenue to pay the court costs for the hundreds of
losing cases the Internal Revenue Service has brought under it."" And
it has never had the in terrorem effect it was designed to have. It
rests on what is undoubtedly an archaic view of the federal government's
constitutional power to tax'70 and should probably be replaced with a
resurrected provision imposing a tax on all transfers within three years
of death.' 7 '
The second purpose of the inquiry was to test the judicial wisdom of
a subjective test for the word "contemplate" (as compared with an
objective test for the word "intended"). 17 That judicial response to
Section 2035 has been administratively unsound. A test based upon
the mechanical operation of Section 2035 would probably have produced
less litigation than the subjective test has produced. 78 Even a test
which narrowed the question to whether or not the decedent intended
to evade death taxes would probably operate more smoothly than Section
2035, as interpreted in Wells, has worked during the last thirty-eight
years. The litigation has been a boon to the legal profession and a
fertile source of conjecture for legal scholars, but it has probably not
redounded to the public good-partly because it is uneconomical and
169 R. S uNn.ts & G. MAXwELL, Th FEDERAL EsTATE AND Girr TAxEs 63 (2d ed.
1967); M. EGN JR., PROBLEMS OF FEDERAL TAXTION OF ESTATES - GHTs - TRUSTS
1.302 (1966).
170 Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932).
17' See W. WARREN & S. SuRREY, FEDERAL ESrATE AND GIFT TAXATION 231-34
(1961).
172 See note 4 supra, United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102 (1931).
178 See the periodical authorities discussed in W. WARREN & S. SuRREY, supra note
171 at 252.
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partly because many judges have proven themselves to be callous psy-
chological pathologists.
The third and fourth purposes of the article-inquiries into planning
and trial tactics for Section 2035 cases, and behavioral inquiry into
attitudes towards death and judicial attitudes towards attitudes towards
death 7 4 -are more fully illuminated by a psychological analysis of
the cases and by the comments of the psychologists who contributed to
this article. Both of these purposes seem to be summarized in the
Dumay opinion and in the judicial opinions on which it was based.
This composite case suggests a realistic psychological point of view.
Advocates have almost literally never used psychological learning in
building cases under Section 2035, nor have judges consulted psycho-
logical information. The result has been a wide array of attitudes and
assumptions that are either untested or patently unsound. Recent psy-
chological research on attitudes toward death 175 is correcting similar
errors in the behavioral sciences. This scholarship is useful to advocates
who are able to build their cases on accurate psychological theory, and
to judges who are able to decide cases on the basis of scientific con-
clusions. Judges and lawyers who bother to look will find this data
available to them directly. They will find that they need not sift their
interest through expert witnesses.
The fourth purpose is the most interesting to a lawyer who looks
upon contemplation of death as something relevant both to his law office
practice and to his life in the courts. Judges in Section 2035 cases even
if they are often inaccurate, are not always callous men. Many of their
opinions are searching inquiries into the way men feel about death, in-
quiries into how we relate our property to our deaths and to the people
we love. These judicial opinions, in other words, are research reports
on how the decedent felt about his death; and they are exhibitions as
well, of the way the judge feels about his own death. They range from
the insensitive (Varner) to the confused and defensive (March) to
judicial openness that is instructive (Dumay). The Wells court caused
lawyers and judges more effort and dismay than it could have predicted
when it decreed that "there is no escape from the necessity of carefully
scrutinizing the circumstances of each case."' 176 As a matter of tax pol-
icy, the struggle has not been worth the grain of objective inquiry it has
174 The attitudes-toward-attitudes research model is suggested in Crown, O'Donovan
& Thompson, Attitudes Toward Attitudes Toward Death, 20 PsycHOLOGicAL REPORTS
1181 (1967).
175 See notes 1, 7, 70, 155 supra.
176 283 U.S. 102, 119 (1931).
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provided. But as a means of exploring what Judge Rubin called the
"heap or collection of different perceptions," the "elusive shadow from
the recesses of the mind, ' 177 which make up a personal psychology of
death, the cases are important to lawyers as counselors and as thoughtful
men.
177 Fatter v. Usry, 269 F. Supp. 582, 584-86; 20 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5941 (E.D. La.
1967).
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